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Abstract  
We argue that the extant evidence for Stoic logic provides all the elements required for a variable-free 
theory of multiple generality, including a number of remarkably modern features that straddle logic 
and semantics, such as the understanding of one- and two-place predicates as functions, the canonical 
formulation of universals as quantified conditionals, a straightforward relation between elements of 
propositional and first-order logic, and the roles of anaphora and rigid order in the regimented 
sentences that express multiply general propositions. We consider and reinterpret some ancient texts 
that have been neglected in the context of Stoic universal and existential propositions and offer new 
explanations of some puzzling features in Stoic logic. Our results confirm that Stoic logic surpasses 
Aristotle’s with regard to multiple generality, and are a reminder that focusing on multiple generality 
through the lens of Frege-inspired variable-binding quantifier theory may hamper our understanding 




Multiple generality is the existence in a sentence or predicate of one quantifier in the 
scope of another. An example of a sentence with multiple generality is  
 Everyone loves someone. 
With Fxy for the predicate ‘x loves y’, one standard symbolization is 
 xy  Fxy 
 2 
The number of possible nestings of quantifiers in the scope of quantifiers is unlimited. 
Certain basic natural language inferences require multiple generality. For example, with a for 
Dio and b for Plato: 
 Everyone loves everyone.   xy  Fxy 
 Hence everyone loves someone.  xy  Fxy 
 
Everyone loves everyone.   xy  Fxy 
 Hence Plato loves Dio.   Fab 
It is generally agreed that one of Frege’s core achievements was the development of a logic 
that can account for multiple generality and that for this purpose he instituted rules that 
govern the stacking of quantifiers.
1
 We don’t quibble with this. There is no explicit surviving 
evidence that the Stoics had a fully worked out theory of multiple generality. Instead, we 
argue that the Stoics had all the elements required to introduce multiple generality. More 
precisely, that among the sparsely surviving evidence on Stoic logic there is sufficient 
material to establish that the Stoics had all those elements for existential and universal 
quantification with more than one quantifier, if not exactly in the way Frege introduced them. 
Rather, their system of quantification is variable free, not unlike that introduced by Quine in 
1960.
2
 To this end, and building on existing literature,
3
 we consider and reinterpret some 
                                                          
1
 Frege 1879, §11. See Dummett 1973, 9; Rumfitt 1994, 599-607; Zalta 2018. 
2
 Quine 1960, cf. 1971, 1981. See also the work by Pauline Jacobson, e.g. Jacobson 1999. 
3
 Some excellent work has been done on Stoic predicates (including some on monadic quantification). 
We mention in particular Atherton 1993, 44-8, 259-264; Atherton and Blank, 2003, 314-6, 320-3; 
Barnes 1986, Barnes 1999; Barnes et al. 1999, 111-4, 197-206; Brunschwig 1986, 287-310 = 1994, 
63-7; Crivelli 1994a, 189-199; Frede 1974, 51-73; Gaskin 1997, 91-104; Lloyd 1978.  There are also 
most useful observations in Durand 2018; Egli, 2000; Long and Sedley 1987, v.1, 199-200; Hülser 
 3 
passages that have not yet been given much attention in the context of multiple generality and 
specify how multiple generality played an active role in Stoic logic. (We note that the 
surviving evidence of Stoic logic of predicates covers only a tiny fraction of what we know 
the Stoics wrote on the topic.)  
The relevance of our undertaking is threefold. First, it establishes that Stoic logic, 
though mostly forgotten at the beginning of the Middle Ages, if not already in the fourth 
century CE, sports considerable advantages over Aristotle’s logic in expressing and dealing 
with multiple generality. Second, it indicates that from Aristotle to Frege, instead of one big 
step – a logical discovery to which all intervening philosophers were ‘simply blind’ 
(Dummett 1973, 9) – there is a somewhat more gradual development. (We remark on the 
relation between Stoic logic and medieval attempts at figuring out multiple generality briefly 
in our conclusion.) Third, it is a reminder that the focus on multiple generality exclusively 
through the lens of Frege-inspired variable-binding quantifier theory  as contrasted with 
variable-free predicate logic  may prevent our appreciation of the development of pre-
Fregean theories of multiple generality. Additionally, we offer new explanations of a couple 
of puzzling elements in Stoic logic.  
One goal of the paper is to introduce a larger audience to the intricacies of Stoic logic 
and to its more general potential. It is for this reason that we very occasionally add a remark 
about how the Stoic theory could be extended in an obvious manner to cover more general 
cases for which there is no evidence either way. Two examples are polyadic predicates with 
higher argument numbers and unrestricted universals. We hope that the footnotes will satisfy 
the expectations of those specializing in Stoic logic that no historical and methodological 
corners have been cut. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1987-8; Hülser et al. 2009. Stoic polyadic quantification has been considered by Urs Egli in his 1993 
and 2000, and we agree with some of his results.  
 4 
The paper is structured as follows: §1 Relevant general remarks on Stoic logic; §2 
Stoic katêgorêmata as monadic predicates; §3 Monadic predicates as functions; §4 Polyadic 
predicates; §5 Variable-free quantification I: monadic indefinite propositions; §6 Variable-
free quantification II: polyadic indefinite propositions; §7 Multiple generality I: scope 
ambiguity; §8 Multiple generality II: anaphoric ambiguity; §9 Polyadic predicates and Stoic 
deduction; §10 Concluding remarks. 
 
1. Some general remarks on Stoic logic  
We remind readers of some very basic elements of Stoic logic. The Stoics sharply 
distinguish linguistic items or ‘speech’ (logos) from what speech signifies. Speech is a 
species of sound, namely, sound that signifies meaning or is significant (sêmantikê) (DL 
7.55-56, 63). ‘Sayables’ (lekta), by contrast, are the incorporeal items that are signified by 
speech (DL 7.57). For example, in uttering “Plato walks”, a speaker ‘says’ the sayable «Plato 
walks». As what is signified by speech, sayables are contents of speech. They thus play a role 
analogous to Fregean senses.
4
 We use double quotation marks to indicate linguistic items 
(speech), guillemets («, ») to indicate content (sayables). Stoic grammar studies the properties 
and parts of speech, while Stoic logic studies the properties and parts of sayables (DL 7.43-
44, 63).
5
 Although many later ancient sources conflate this distinction, orthodox Stoics are 
careful to keep apart the subject-matter of grammar and logic. 
 Stoic contents are structured, and their structure corresponds – to some degree – to the 
structure of language. In classifying the various kinds of content, the Stoics rely on 
grammatical properties of the linguistic items that express them. For instance, the monadic 
                                                          
4
 Gaskin 1997, 94-95; Barnes et al. 1999, 95-96.  
5
 For an excellent, detailed, introduction to Stoic grammar see Atherton & Blank 2003. An excellent 
introduction to Stoic logic is Ierodiakonou 2006. 
 5 
predicate (katêgorêma) «…loves Plato» is signified by a verb and a declined noun, and Stoic 
propositions (axiômata) tend to be signified by declarative sentences. Propositions are the 
fundamental items within Stoic logic, and, as the sole non-derivative bearers of truth-value, 
can be compared to Fregean thoughts.
6
 So the relation between sayables and propositions is 
analogous to that between Fregean senses and Fregean thoughts. The most basic distinction 
of Stoic propositions is that between simple and non-simple ones (DL 7.68-69; SE M 8.93, 
95, 108). The simple ones include negations of simple propositions. Non-simple propositions 
are those that are put together from more than one proposition or one proposition taken twice 
and which are governed by one or more connective parts or a negation operator. For example, 
a disjunction is governed by the connective parts ‘either’ (for the first disjunct) and ‘or’ (for 
the second). The principal non-simple propositions are conjunction, conditional and exclusive 
disjunction.
7
 Negations and non-simple propositions are defined iteratively: the language of 
Stoic propositional logic is syntactically closed under negation, conjunction, disjunction and 
conditional. 
The Stoics do not posit a perfect one-to-one correspondence between content and 
speech. The grammatical properties of speech are a defeasible, and potentially misleading, 
guide to the content it signifies. (“p and q or r” is an example.) On the Stoic view, one and 
                                                          
6
 See Barnes et al. 1999, 93-96 for the limitations of this comparison. Note also that there is 
disagreement among scholars on Stoic logic and linguistics with regard to the question whether 
sayables are mind independent. Mind dependency is defended most recently in De Harven 2018, 228-
230 and before that e.g.  in Alessandrelli 2013 and Long 1971, 96-98, while e.g. Barnes 1999, 211, 
Shogry 2019, 37 fn. 12, and Bronowski 2019, 165-9 defend mind independency. This paper is 
independent of how one leans on this question.  
7
 DL 7.68-74, SE M 8.93-94, 108. For detailed treatment of the simple and non-simple propositions, 
see Barnes et al. 1999, 96-111. 
 6 
the same expression of natural language, if it is ambiguous, expresses multiple contents.
8
 
Moreover, the same content can be signified by different pieces of speech (Barnes et al. 1999, 
96-97).  
 To remove ambiguity in natural language, the Stoics introduce a system of linguistic 
conventions that ensure that the form of speech reveals the contents being expressed.
9
 Many 
of them concern word order. Most languages either have case marking or rigid order 
(Miyagawa 2012, ch. 10). Whereas English, for example, has basically no case marking but 
fairly rigid order, ancient Greek is found toward the other end of the spectrum, with very little 
rigid order but fairly articulated case marking. This works to the advantage of the Stoics in 
their attempt to structurally disambiguate language by means of regimentation. It is far easier 
to introduce some distinctive requirements of rigid order into a natural language with 
extensive case marking, than to introduce case markings into a natural language with rigid 
order. For instance, to signify the negation of «Plato is walking», the formulation “Plato is 
not walking” is discouraged by the Stoics. It is reserved for the affirmation «Plato is not 
walking», which, since it is assumed to entail the existence of Plato, is not contradictory to 
«Plato is walking».
10
 Instead the Stoics recommend prefixing the negation particle to the 
sentence that signifies the proposition it is negating thus “Not: Plato is walking” (which is 
grammatical in Greek). This accurately reflects the scope of the Stoic negation operator. 
Generally, there is plentiful evidence that the Stoics used the following principle which we 
call the 
                                                          
8
 For detailed discussion, see all of Atherton 1993, but esp. 131-3. 
9
 On Stoic natural language regimentation, see Bronowski 2019, 212-4, Atherton and Blank 2003, 
314-6, Barnes et al. 1999, 96-7, and Frede 1974. 
10
 See e.g. Apul. Herm. 191.6-11, Alex. An. Pr. 402.3-19 and Barnes et al. 1999, 102, and also §7 
below.  
 7 
Scope Principle: The expression that signifies the content element or operator with 
the largest scope in a proposition is the first expression in the sentence, or as close to 
the beginning of the sentence as grammar permits. If an operator consists of more 
than one part, the expression that signifies its first part is the first expression in the 
sentence, or as close to the beginning of the sentence as grammar permits.
11
  
In the Stoic view, language (speech), suitably regimented, is an appropriate tool to represent 
the structure of sayables, i.e. of content. 
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 Cf. for example the Stoic definitions and examples of negative proposition (ἀποφατικόν, starting 
with οὐχί: DL 7.69, SE M 8.89, 8.103, cf. Apul. Herm. 191.6-11 cui negativa particula praeponitur), 
eliminating proposition (ἀρνητικόν, starting with οὐδείς: DL 7.70), privative proposition (στερητικόν, 
starting with predicate expression with alpha privativum: DL 7.70), affirmative proposition 
(κατηγορικόν, starting with noun/name: DL 7.70), middle proposition (μέσον, starting with 
noun/name: SE M 8.97), deiktic proposition (καταγορευτικόν, starting with demonstrative pronoun: 
DL 7.70), definite proposition (ὡρισμένον, starting with demonstrative pronoun: SE M 8.96-7, Alex. 
An.Pr. 177-8), conditional proposition (συνημμένον, starting with εἰ: DL 7.71, SE PH 2.157-8, SE M 
8.109-10), paraconditional (παρασυνημμένον, starting with ἐπεί: DL 7.71), conjunctive proposition 
(συμπεπλεγμένον, starting with καί: DL 7.72, Apoll. Dysc. On Conjunctions 218.15-19), negated 
conjunctive proposition (ἀποφατικὴ συμπλοκής, starting with οὐχὶ καὶ: SE M 8.226), disjunctive 
proposition (διεζευγμένον, starting with ἤτοι or ἢ: DL 7.72, SE PH 1.69, 2.158, SE M 8.434; cf. Gell. 
16.8.13), causal proposition (αἰτιῶδες, starting with διότι: DL 7.72), co-assumption (πρόσληψις, has 
particle δέ as second word: DL 7.76), conclusion (ἐπιφορά, has ἄρα as second word: DL 7.76, SE M 
8.302), question (ἐρώτημα, starting with ἄρα: DL 7.66, Ammon. Int. 199.20-3), inquiry (πύσμα, 
starting with an interrogative pronoun, e.g. ποῦ: SE 8.71-2, Ammon, Int. 200.5-10), quasi-proposition 
(ὅμοιον ἀξιώματι, starting with ὡς: DL 7.67, Ammon. Int. 2.32-4). See also Barnes et al. 1999, 101; 
Atherton 1993, 78-79; Frede 1974, 189-201.  
 8 
Stoic propositions are of central importance for the Stoic system of deduction (Stoic 
syllogistic), which, unlike Aristotle’s syllogistic, is a propositional sequent logic. This 
notwithstanding, the Stoics, in particular Chrysippus, third head of the Stoa and by far the 
greatest Stoic logician, displayed a keen interest in the logical significance of sub-
propositional elements. These include (i) the logical relations between ‘says that x’, ‘x’ and 
‘x is true’, possibly in connection with the Liar paradox; (ii) a sophisticated theory of 
demonstratives; (iii) the logic of plural expressions;
12
  and (iv), most relevant to our purposes, 




 Work on Hellenistic philosophy is methodologically complex, and work on Stoic 
logic is so in particular. Evidence is very fragmentary. Of hundreds of books (i.e. papyrus 
rolls) on Stoic logic only one has survived (Chrysippus’ Logical Investigations)
13
 and in a 
sorry state. Everything else is one or more steps removed from the original texts. Sources are 
dependable to different extents for various reasons, and we will occasionally remark on the 
reliability of a source. For details, the reader is referred to specialist secondary literature.
14
 
Some guidance is given by extensive lists of book titles on Stoic logic and a detailed 
summary of Stoic logic in Diogenes Laertius. Many passages of great interest have survived 
                                                          
12
 See (i) Crivelli 1994b; (ii) Frede 1974, 53-61; Lloyd 1978; Barnes et al. 1999, 93-101; Durand 
2018, 103-31, (iii) Cavini 1993; Barnes et al. 1999, 152-5. 
13
 PHerc. 307, col. xiii.19-22, ed. L. Marrone, ‘Le Questioni Logici di Crisippo (PHerc 307)’ in 
Cronache Ercolanesi 27, 1997, 83-100. A lacunose but long papyrus fragment and the only one of 
Chrysippus’ books on logic of which we have direct evidence. For excellent general discussion of this 
text, see Barnes 1986; Barnes et al. 1999, 69-71; and Marrone 1997. Earlier editions of the papyrus 
appear in FDS as 698 and in SVF 2 as frag. 298a.   
14
 E.g. Mansfeld 1999, 3-30; Hülser 1987-8, XXXII-LXVIII; Bobzien 1998, 5-12; Barnes 1999, 69-
76. 
 9 
quoted or paraphrased in often much later authors many of them hostile to Stoic philosophy. 
We do our best to unscramble the scraps of egg. Translations are our own, unless otherwise 
noted.  
 
2. Stoic katêgorêmata as monadic predicates: definitions  
Stoic predicates (their term is katêgorêma) are contents
15
 and as such belong to Stoic 
logic, rather than Stoic grammar. Our sources indicate that, probably starting with 
Chrysippus, the Stoics had an elaborate logical theory of katêgorêmata that was developed 
over several generations.
16
 Chrysippus’, and perhaps generally the early Stoic, notion of 
katêgorêmata was one of monadic predicates. A matching Stoic definition is 
(A) A katêgorêma is … an incomplete sayable that can be connected with an 
upright case-content (orthê ptôsis) to yield a proposition.
17
  (DL 7.64)  
                                                          
15
 The first Stoic for whom there is evidence for this view is Chrysippus’ predecessor Cleanthes, who 
states that katêgorêmata are lekta (Clement, Strom. 8.9.26.4).  Post-Cleanthean evidence for this claim 
is adduced throughout this Section. 
16
 Chrysippus wrote fourteen books on katêgorêmata, one on active (ortha) and passive (huptia) 
katêgorêmata, one on event-predicates (sumbamata, emendation, von Arnim) (DL 7.191). We expect 
treatment of katêgorêmata in his books on indefinite and temporal propositions (DL 7.190). 
Katêgorêmata also feature prominently in Chrysippus’ Log. Inv. Apollodorus offered a definition of 
katêgorêma (below). Cleanthes and Sphaerus of Borysthenes (pupil of Zeno and Cleanthes), authored 
one work each on katêgorêmata (DL 7.175, 178), though these may concern their causal aspect. For 
these aspects of katêgorêmata, see Bobzien 1998, 18-21, and Hankinson 1999, 483-486. We set them 
aside here. 
17
 Ἔστι δὲ τὸ κατηγόρημα … λεκτὸν ἐλλιπὲς συντακτὸν ὀρθῇ πτώσει πρὸς ἀξιώματος γένεσιν. We 
here translate suntaktos as ‘can be connected’, rather than the alternative ‘connected’, since a 
katêgorêma is not necessarily always connected with something (DL 7.63 and §3). (A) is the third in a 
 10 
The definition (A) classifies katêgorêmata as a kind of content that can be connected with 
other things. It specifies these things as upright case-contents, and the resulting content as a 
proposition. A Stoic case-content (ptôsis) can be thought of as the content signified by a 
noun.
18
 An upright case-content is the case-content signified by a nominative noun. Thus text 
(A) suggests that a katêgorêma is akin to a monadic predicate. Two later ancient texts contain 
variants of this definition.   
(B) Now, if something is predicated of a noun and yields an assertible content, it is 
called by them [i.e. the Stoics] katêgorêma and an event predicate, as «is walking» 
yields for example «Socrates is walking».
19
 (Ammon. Int. 44.23-25) 
(C) That which is predicated, then, is predicated of an upright noun or [upright] case-
content … If [what is predicated of an upright noun or [upright] case-content] 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
list of three independent definitions, most probably originating in different works by different Stoics, 
as is common in compendia and epitomes of Stoic doctrine. The first definition is ‘a katêgorêma is 
that which is said of something’ (Ἔστι δὲ τὸ κατηγόρημα τὸ κατά τινος ἀγορευόμενον). It is less 
specific than (A), but indicates that katêgorêmata are monadic predicates. The second definition is our 
text (D). 
18
 The subject of Stoic cases or case-contents (πτῶσις) is difficult. We assume, with Gaskin 1997, 94-
101, and Durand 2018, 73-78, that ptôseis are contents. For alternative views, see Bronowski 2019, 
352-9; Long and Sedley 1987, 200 v.1; Frede 1994, 13-17; see also the discussion in Atherton & 
Blank 2003, 324-326. Nothing should hinge on this question here. 
19
 ἂν μὲν οὖν ὀνόματός τι κατηγορηθὲν ἀπόφανσιν ποιῇ, κατηγόρημα καὶ σύμβαμα παρ’ αὐτοῖς 
ὀνομάζεται (σημαίνει γὰρ ἄμφω ταὐτόν), ὡς τὸ περιπατεῖ, οἷον Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ. (Ammon. Int. 
44.23-25) For the Stoic event predicates (σύμβαμα) see below §3. (Square brackets in a translation 
indicate a phrase supplied by context. Angled brackets in text and translation are used to indicate a 
textual emendation.) 
 11 
produces a complete sentence, they call it katêgorêma or event predicate.
20
 
(Stephanus, Int. 11.9-12)  
(The texts mix Peripatetic with Stoic terminology; cf. fns. 54, 56. A canonically Stoic 
formulation would not have ‘upright noun’ and would have ‘proposition’ or ‘complete 
content’ for ‘complete sentence’.)  The definition of ‘katêgorêma’ as monadic predicate is 
thus well-attested. 
A second Stoic definition of ‘katêgorêma’ allows for two readings. First, a reading as 
an account of monadic predicates. Second, a reading as an account that includes monadic and 
polyadic predicates:  
(D) A katêgorêma is … an object
21
 that can be connected with some thing or 
some things, as Apollodorus
22
 says. (DL 7.64)
23
 
On the first reading, the phrase ‘some thing or some things’ refers to a singular or plural 
content of which the predicate is predicated (‘this one walks’, ‘these walk’).
24
 This reading is 
compatible with the definition in texts (A), (B), and (C), which says nothing about the 
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 τὸ κατηγορούμενόν τινος ἢ ὀνόματος κατηγορεῖται ἤγουν εὐθείας ἢ πτώσεως. ... ῆ. καὶ εἰ μὲν 
αὐτοτελῆ τὸν λόγον ἀπεργάζεται, καλοῦσιν αὐτὸν κατηγόρημα ἢ σύμβαμα. (Stephanus, Int. 11.9-12).  
21
 In their logic the Stoics appear to use lekton (‘sayable’) and pragma (which we translate as ‘object’) 
synonymously, e.g. DL 7.57, 63. See also Bronowski 2019, 118-9; Atherton 1993, 250; Barnes et al. 
1999, 197-198. 
22
 Reference is to the 2nd century BCE Stoic Apollodorus of Seleucia, student of Diogenes of 
Babylon.  
23
 Ἔστι δὲ τὸ κατηγόρημα ... πρᾶγμα συντακτὸν περί τινος ἢ τινῶν, ὡς οἱ περὶ Ἀπολλόδωρόν φασιν 
(DL 7.64). The ancient Greek phrase ὡς οἱ περὶ X φασιν is almost always just another way of saying 
‘as X says’, and we translate accordingly. 
24
 Long and Sedley 1987, v.2 p. 199, Barnes 1999, 204, note the possibility of this interpretation 
without endorsing it. Hicks 1925, Hülser 1987-8, p. 809, p. 933, and Mensch 2018 adopt this reading.  
 12 
number (singular or plural) of the case-content.
25
 It makes the definition one of ‘katêgorêma’ 
as monadic predicate, except that it takes pluralities in addition to singularities in subject 
place (e.g. ‘these’ or ‘some’). Strong independent evidence supports this reading. Thus text  
(E) Moreover, they also make this distinction: desire is for those things which are said 
of some person or several persons, which the [Stoic] logicians call κατηγορήματα, for 
example «to have riches» or «to receive honours».
26
 (Cic. Tusc. Disp. 4.21)  
contains implicitly a very similar Stoic definition, namely:
27
  
(1)  A katêgorêma is that which is said of one or more people (or things).  
The examples in (E) are analogues to monadic predicates that can be said of one or more 
persons: ‘someone has riches’, ‘some have riches’. So (E) confirms the first reading. Further 
corroboration may be the fact that Chrysippus had an interest in singular and plural 
expressions (DL 7.192) and possibly considered singular and plural katêgorêmata in Log. Inv. 
I.5-7, I.15-20, II.21-6.
28
 Singular and plural expressions as possible arguments for Stoic 
                                                          
25
 Pace Barnes 1999, 204, who assumes that the definition in (A) presupposes the addition of a 
singular nominative case.   
26
 Distinguunt illud etiam, ut libido sit earum rerum, quae dicuntur, de quodam aut quibusdam, quae  
κατηγορήματα dialectici appellant, ut habere divitias, capere honores. The de quodam aut quibusdam 
could also be translated as neuter (Graver 2002, 46): ‘desire is for those things which are said of some 
thing or some things’. This produces a more general definition of monadic predicates. We note that 
Cicero is generally a reliable source for early Stoic doctrine. 
27
 We can imagine the Greek: κατηγόρημα τὸ κατά τινος ἢ τινῶν ἀγορευόμενον. Cicero’s quodam aut 
quibusdam clearly refers to the upright case-content, the upright πτῶσις. (1) appears to be a fusion of 
the second definition of katêgorêma at DL 7.64 with the first (given in fn. 17 above). 
28
 All pointed out by Barnes 1999, 204 n 167. Cf. also Frede 1974, 53. 
 13 
monadic predicates are also mentioned in a later text.
29
  
On the second reading of (D), the definition would refer to what in contemporary 
logic would be the arguments the predicate takes (‘this one walks’, ‘Dio sees Plato converse 
with Socrates’). The definition would then cover both monadic and polyadic predicates.
30
 
This reading is sometimes thought to be supported by the second of two Stoic definitions of 
‘verb’ (rhêma), which displays salient parallels to (D).
31
   
(F) A verb is ... , or as some say, a caseless element of speech that signifies something 




This definition does not mention katêgorêmata. The parallel to (D) suggests that the signified 
‘something’ is a katêgorêma in the sense of that text. Now, a verb may leave room for more 
than one case-content, and the Stoics were aware of this. So, this definition of ‘verb’ may 
favour the reading of (D) as a definition of katêgorêma as one that covers monadic and 
polyadic cases.   
 We see two possibilities.
33
 Either all Stoics used the term katêgorêma throughout for 
monadic predicates only. Or the term katêgorêma was originally, and by Chrysippus among 
others (see §3), used for monadic predicates only, but a couple of generations later, the Stoic 
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 ‘It rues this one, it rues these.’ in Ammonius’s report of the Stoic parasumbamata (Ammon. Int. 
44.32, for which see below §§ 3 and 4.1).  
30
 This reading is adopted by Gaskin, 1997, 93; Hülser et al. 2009, 378. 
31
 Noted by Barnes 1999, 203, fn. 65; Atherton 1993, 45-46. 
32
 ῥῆμα δέ ἐστι ... ἤ, ὥς τινες, στοιχεῖον λόγου ἄπτωτον, σημαῖνόν τι συντακτὸν περί τινος ἢ τινῶν, 
οἷον Γράφω, Λέγω· (DL 7.58) ἄπτωτον is often translated as ‘undeclinable’ or the like. As Stoic case-
contents (πτώσεις) are not linguistic items, the meaning is more likely that verbs do not signify case-
contents. 
33
 Ultimately, the evidence is not conclusive for either, as Barnes 1999, 204 also concludes. 
 14 
Apollodorus added an alternative notion of katêgorêma as that which is signified by a verb 
and that hence includes both what we call monadic and what we call polyadic predicates. 
This alternative notion would have been grammatically motivated and from a logical 
perspective a serious step back compared to the earlier notion, since it no longer provides for 
one-place predicates of complex forms like Fxap (see §3). Either way, it is certain that 
Chrysippus and other early Stoics had a logical notion of monadic predicates and used 
‘katêgorêma’ to express that notion; moreover that this notion was the prevalent Stoic one 
((A), (B), (C), (E) above, and §3). Hereafter ‘monadic predicate’ translates the Stoic 
‘katêgorêma’ as and when it is used for that notion.
34
    
                                                          
34
 Gaskin 1997 argues that katêgorêma was used in a broad and in a narrow way: in the narrow sense, 
only a verb that lacks nothing but a nominative case content for completion is a katêgorêma; in the 
broad sense, any verb signifies a katêgorêma (93, 103). We believe that Gaskin’s view rests on two 
errors and some unproven conjectures. His main error is in his argument that DL 7.64 (our text (A)) 
implies that the Stoics insisted that every proposition requires a nominative case, i.e. that it is a 
necessary condition for something to be a proposition that it contains a nominative case (91-92 and 
then repeated passim). However, DL.7.64 is a definition not of propositions (axiômata) but of 
katêgorêmata. It only commits one to the view that the Stoics maintained that it is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for something to be a katêgorêma, that completion with a nominative case 
generates a proposition. Gaskin’s mistaken assumption guides his entire argument and without it, the 
argument collapses. We believe that Gaskin is also in error when assuming that what is generally 
accepted to be a lacuna in DL 7.64 contained a fourfold distinction (for which see our §4) and that this 
is usually assumed (92 with fn. 3). The fourfold distinction is not reported for Chrysippus; the twofold 
distinction between sumbamata and parasumbamata is; and it is parasumbamata alone that are 
usually assumed to have gone missing in the lacuna. So Gaskin cannot use his conjecture of a fourfold 
distinction in the lacuna to back up his –mistaken– assumption that a nominative case is necessary for 
something to be a Stoic proposition. Gaskin’s incorrect assumption leads him to some further 
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3. Monadic predicates (katêgorêmata) as functions  
It has been suggested that one can think of Stoic katêgorêmata as functions roughly in 
the sense in which Frege considered predicates as functions.
35
 We agree with this. In fact, we 
argue that the similarities go further than has been pointed out. There is no direct evidence 
that the Stoics had a term for ‘function’. Rather, one needs to show that the role katêgorêmata 
(and related notions) play in Stoic logic provides sufficient evidence for this suggestion. 
Good initial evidence can be found in the Stoic definitions of three kinds of simple 
affirmative propositions. Of these there survive two sets. They appear to match in content, 
and partially in terminology.
36
 A ‘definite’ proposition consists of a demonstrative upright 
case-content (ptosis) and a katêgorêma. A ‘middle’ proposition consists of an upright case-
content and a katêgorêma. An ‘indefinite’ proposition consists of one or more indefinite parts 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
implausible conjectures, such as that the Stoics believed that an upright case-content would in the 
parakatêgorêmata or parasumbamata be expressed by an oblique linguistic expression (95, 98). 
Gaskin’s view also cannot account for the more complex monadic predicates (katêgorêmata) attested 
for Chrysippus (PHerc 307, see our §3). For our view on the relations between sumbamata, 
parasumbamata and katêgorêmata see below fn.54. 
35
 Frege 1891, 1904. See Gaskin 1997, 94-101; Hülser et al. 2009, 378. Cf. also Egli 1986. Atherton 
questions the analogy, Atherton 1993, 45-46, n. 10. 
36
 Sextus has ‘indefinite’ (aoriston), ‘middle’ (meson), and ‘definite’ (hôrismenon) (M 8.97-100), 
Diogenes ‘indefinite’ (aoriston), ‘categorical’ (katêgorikon), and ‘cateugoretical’ (katêgoreutikon). 
(DL 7.70). We follow Sextus’s usage, in part because of the obscurity of Diogenes’s terms. Our focus 
will be the indefinite propositions, whose terminology is agreed on by both sources. For general 
discussion of this classification, see Frede 1974, 53-67; Durand 2019, §§2-6; Barnes et al. 1999, 97-




 Examples for definites are «this one is walking» «this one is sitting», for 
middle ones «Dio is walking», «Socrates is walking», «a human being is sitting» and for 
indefinites «someone is walking», «someone is sitting».
38
 The set of definitions and the 
matching examples of the three kinds of affirmative simple propositions suggest that the 
katêgorêma (monadic predicate) is like a function that can be completed by slotting into its 
argument place an argument of one of three kinds.
39
 These show some similarity, in order, to 
a demonstrative, an individual constant and something like a variable bound by an existential 
quantifier. The kind of argument that fills the argument place of the katêgorêma determines 
the kind of proposition one gets.  
Further evidence is provided by the Stoic notions of complete and incomplete 
contents. We are told that  
                                                          
37
 There is a textual problem in Diogenes’ definition of the indefinite, for which see below §5. 
38
 DL 7.70, SE M 8.96-98. Anthrôpos could express the generic, ‘human being’, or to what is 
expressed in English by an indefinite article and a noun phrase, ‘a human being’. The context makes 
clear that here it is the latter. See Barnes et al. 1999, 98. The co-classification of proper names and 
generic nouns as one class of expressions may seem odd. It is motivated by Stoic metaphysics. See 
Long and Sedley 1987, 182, v.1; Bailey 2014, 285-290. The reasons why «a human being is sitting» is 
middle and not indefinite, and is lumped together with «Dio is walking» are again metaphysical rather 
than logical and we disregard them, since we are after multiple generality. For details see e.g. 
Bronowski 2019, 304-40; Durand 2018, 66 n.6, 169, Bailey 2014, 295-298 and Caston 1999, 187-192. 
39
 Another example (SE M 8.308): ‘If some god tells you that this one will be rich, this one will be 
rich; but this god here (I point at Zeus, by hypothesis) tells you that this one will be rich.’ See further 
discussion in Durand 2019, §§ 46-7. 
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(G) An incomplete content is one whose expression is unfinished, for example 
«writes»
40
, for we ask ‘who?’. Complete is a content that has the expression finished, 
for example «Socrates writes». Katêgorêmata are among the incomplete contents, and 
propositions among the complete contents.
41
 (DL 7.63) 
The incomplete content «writes» can be completed variously by «Dio», «a human being», 
«this one», «someone», «the teacher Kallias», just as a Fregean predicate function can be 
completed by its argument (including in that case a variable-binding quantifier).
42
  
As to the value of a completed predicate function, in the case of propositions, it seems 
to be a truth-evaluable complete content, or, in other words, the proposition itself: it is only 
(and precisely) assertible complete contents that have a truth-value, either being true or being 
false. By completing a katêgorêma with one of the options for arguments from above, a 
proposition, and that is a content with a truth-value, is generated (cf. text (A)). And one 
definition of Stoic propositions is that they are complete contents that are either true or false 
(SE M 8.73; DL 7.65). 
Thus there are good reasons to assume that the Stoics themselves thought of a 
katêgorêma as something similar to a function: something that, when completed by an 
                                                          
40
 As Gaskin 1997, 102-103 points out, the Greek γράφει is ambiguous and leaves unclear whether 
one should be translate “writes” or “he writes”. In any event, it is clear that the content expressed is an 
incomplete content, i.e. the katêgorêma, «…writes». Cf. Barnes et al. 1999, 203. 
41
 ἐλλιπῆ μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὰ ἀναπάρτιστον ἔχοντα τὴν ἐκφοράν, οἷον Γράφει· ἐπιζητοῦμεν γάρ, Τίς; 
αὐτοτελῆ δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ ἀπηρτισμένην ἔχοντα τὴν ἐκφοράν, οἷον Γράφει Σωκράτης. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς 
ἐλλιπέσι λεκτοῖς τέτακται τὰ κατηγορήματα, ἐν δὲ  τοῖς αὐτοτελέσι τὰ ἀξιώματα. 
42
 Since in Stoic sources the arguments themselves («Dio», «a human being», etc.) are never called, or 
adduced as examples of, incomplete contents, we assume that they are not incomplete.  
 18 
argument, produces a truth-evaluable complete content.
43
 This ‘modern’ understanding of 
katêgorêma as function is further confirmed by examples of katêgorêmata whose logical 
structure is of greater complexity. In §2 we argued that the Stoic term katêgorêma is best 
translated as monadic predicate. The simplest examples were expressed by finite verbal 
phrases, such as “is walking”, “is writing”, “is thinking” (DL 7.63, 64). A second Stoic 
definition of ‘verb’ as ‘a part of speech that signifies an uncompounded (asuntheton) 
monadic predicate’ (DL 7.58)
44
 suggests that the Stoics have an expression for such basic 
monadic predicates: uncompounded monadic predicates.
45
 Their general form would be  
                                                          
43
 In some cases in which a katêgorêma is completed by an argument, the resulting value is a complete 
content that is not truth-evaluable, or at least not in any straightforward manner. Examples are a 
promise or a command. See Chrysippus, Log. Inv. col. XIII; DL 7.66-68; and SE M 8.70-74. We do 
not discuss such non-propositional complete contents here. See Barnes 1986 for discussion of the 
logic of commands. 
44
 ῥῆμα δέ ἐστι μέρος λόγου σημαῖνον ἀσύνθετον κατηγόρημα, ὡς ὁ Διογένης (DL 7.58). The 
definition is attributed to Diogenes of Babylon, pupil of Chrysippus, logic teacher of Carneades. 
45
 Asuntheta katêgorêmata: For this expression see e.g. Mich.Sync. 79: ‘As to its genus, every verb is 
said to be a katêgorêma (i.e. by the Stoics); as species there are compounded katêgorêmata and 
uncompounded katêgorêmata. A compounded [katêgorêma] is one which is combined with the case of 
a name or a pronoun, whereas an uncompounded [katêgorêma] is the verb itself said on its own. The 
Stoics call the combining compounding.’ (πᾶν ῥῆμα γενικῶς λέγεται κατηγόρημα· εἰδικῶς δὲ 
σύνθετον κατηγόρημα καὶ ἀσύνθετον κατηγόρημα· σύνθετον μέν ἐστι τὸ συντεταγμένον πτώσει 
ὀνόματος ἢ ἀντωνυμίας· ἀσύνθετον δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ ῥῆμα τὸ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ λεγόμενον· σύνθεσιν δὲ οἱ 
Στωϊκοὶ τὴν σύνταξιν λέγουσιν.)  Note that this late source, as is quite common (see §1), confuses the 
levels of language and content and does not distinguish between verb and katêgorêma. This kind of 
Stoic use of asunthetos in DL 7.58 is also confirmed at SE M 8.136, ‘no proposition is 
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(2)  ...F    or in contemporary terms   Fx   
There are also a considerable number of examples of monadic predicates, explicitly 
called katêgorêmata, that consist of more than what is signified by a verb. First, there are 
several which have two components: “to sail through rocks”, “to have riches” and “to obtain 
honours”, “to drink absinthe”, all expressed with the verb in the infinitive.
46
 Just as in the 
case of uncompounded monadic predicates, their form can be symbolized as  
(2)  ...F    or in contemporary terms   Fx 
though F itself is signified by a complex expression that combines a verb with a generic 
singular or plural noun, either declined or as a prepositional phrase. This is in accordance 
with the fact that ‘katêgorêma’ is a logical expression as compared with a grammatical one. It 
is its incompleteness, not its corresponding to what is expressed by a verb that determines its 
character. But we can do better. 
Chrysippus is our best source for monadic-predicate analogues to contemporary logic. 
One crucial bit of evidence is from his Logical Investigations. Here we find in consecutive 
lines the following juxtaposition of what is called a proposition (axiôma) and what is called a 
monadic predicate (katêgorêma) (Col.XIII, 17-22):  
(3) The proposition «Dio is walking, but if not, he is sitting.» (Col. XIII lines 17-19) 
(4) The katêgorêma «to walk, but if not, to sit» (Col. XIII lines 19-22) 
In the vicinity, there are similar constructions, which must also be katêgorêmata (Col.XI). Of 
particular interest is    
                                                                                                                                                                                    
uncompounded’ (οὐδὲν ἀξίωμα ἀσύνθετον). See also Gaskin 1997, 93 for the term ‘uncompounded’ 
used of katêgorêmata. 
46
 DL 7.64: διὰ πέτρας πλεῖν; cf. SE M 8.297. Tusc. Disp. 4.21: habere divitias, capere honores; SE 
PH 2.230, 232: τὸ ἀψίνθιον πιεῖν. 
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(5) «to walk, since it is day»  (Col. XI lines 24-25)
 47
  
It is the peculiar technical formulation with infinitives which indicates that what is at issue is 
a predicate (qua incomplete sayable, not qua part of a – complete – proposition).
48
 (4) and (5) 
are of critical importance, since they show that for Chrysippus a monadic predicate is not that 
which is signified by a verb (rhêma). (Those are the uncompounded monadic predicates.) 
Rather, it can be signified by a rather complex expression and contain both a plurality of 
katêgorêmata and two-place connectives and a negator (4) and even propositions (5). 
(Reader, let this sink in, please, because it is extraordinary!) In contemporary symbolism, the 
analogous monadic predicate to (4) would be perhaps 
(6)  Fx  (Fx  Gx) 
and to (5) 
(7)   p  (p  Fx)
49
 
It does not matter what contemporary symbolism exactly would capture these two 
predicates.
50
 It matters that either time we have as monadic predicate a logical item that, until 
                                                          
47
 The Greek is (3) περιπατεῖ Δίων, εἰ δὲ μὴ, κάθηται, (4) περιπατεῖν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, καθῆσθαι and (5) 
περιπατεῖν, ἐπεὶ δ’ ἡμέρα ἐ[στι]ν. The cases in Col. XI are referred to without a specific noun. We 
assume that τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο (Col. XI. 23) is short for τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο κατηγόρημα. 
48
 Cf. the examples in fn. 46 above. See also Barnes 1999, 203 n. 164, who assembles yet more 
examples (SE PH 3.14, M 9.211, Seneca Epist. 117.3, 12 and for Zeno Stobaeus Ecl. 1.13.1c) and 
Inwood 1985, 65 ‘Stealing and not stealing are predicates and are indicated in the Greek by the 
infinitive form of the verb, which is often used to stand for predicates’.  
49
 The corresponding complete content is a quasi-conditional (parasunêmmenon). DL 7.71 provides 
its (Fregean-sounding) truth-conditions. See Barnes et al. 1999, 108-9. 
50
 Alternatively, one could use Church’s lambda calculus. A lambda abstractor would then bind the 
variables in (4) and (5) and quantification would be applied to the resulting expression. In this way, 
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Frege, would generally not have been called a predicate.
51
 How do we know that there are to 
be three (or two) x’s rather than an x and a y (in contemporary speak), in which latter case we 
would have a dyadic predicate? First, we know this because we are given (3) as the 
corresponding proposition (complete content) for (4), with the analogous contemporary form 
(8)   Fa  (Fa  Ga).   
Second, a katêgorêma is by its definition a monadic predicate (§2). So there is undoubtable 
evidence that the Stoics (and in particular Chrysippus) have monadic predicates that may 
contain as components connectives, more than one predicate and whole propositions.    
 The Stoics made progress over their predecessors with regard to the understanding of 
predicates as ‘objects of logic’ also in a further respect. This is their distinction between event 
predicates (sumbamata) (DL 7.64) and secondary-event predicates (parasumbamata). The 
distinction is Chrysippean
52
 and we know little about its origin. Later ancient texts 
unquestionably understand both Stoic notions as analogues to monadic predicates. They 
associate event predicates with monadic predicates ((B) and (C)) and secondary-event 
predicates with monadic secondary predicates (parakatêgorêmata). They define the 
secondary-event predicates as: ‘it yields an assertible content when predicated of an [oblique] 
case-content (ptôsis)’ and state that ‘it is like a secondary predicate, as in the case of «to ... is 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
quantification itself does not bind variables, a situation that arguably comes closer to Stoic 
quantification than Frege-style quantification.  
51
 Such complex monadic predicates also seem to feature in the Stoic theory of action, on which 
actions (hormai in Stoic terms) are directed at katêgorêmata (Arius in Stobaeus. Ecl. 2.9b = 88 
Wachsmuth; cf. Cic. Tusc. Disp. 4.21, quoted above, and discussion in Inwood 1985, 118-126.)  
52
 Cf. Lucian, Vit. Auct. 21. Chrysippus also wrote a work on sumbamata – if von Arnim’s 
emendation is correct (DL 7.191). See also Barnes 1996. 
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regret» for example «to Socrates is regret»’ (Ammon. Int. 44.25-7).
53
 Now, the Stoics find 
themselves in a long tradition that takes it as given that the subject-predicate distinction 
provides the basic components of sentences, with the subject expression generally in the 
nominative. By introducing the secondary-event predicates as a kind of monadic predicate 
and labelling it ‘secondary’, the Stoics increase the scope of what is logically treatable. In 
logic, it does not matter whether a sentence that expresses a proposition has a noun (or noun 
clause) in the nominative. What matters is that the sentence reflects the structure of the 
predicate function, here «to ... is regret» and how it can be completed into a proposition, here 
«to Socrates is regret». That the argument of the function is an oblique case-content and is 
expressed with the dative becomes secondary for its being a predicate.
54
 (Below in §7 and §8 
                                                          
53
 ἂν δὲ [πλαγίου] πτώσεως [τι κατηγορηθὲν ἀπόφανσιν ποιῇ], παρασύμβαμα [παρ’ αὐτοῖς 
ὀνομάζεται]… καὶ ὂν οἷον παρακατηγόρημα, ὡς ἔχει τὸ «μεταμέλει», οἷον «Σωκράτει μεταμέλει» 
(Ammon. Int. 44.25-7). Barnes’ translation ‘it rues Socrates’ is more elegant. Our clumsy rendering is 
designed to make explicit the relation with the oblique case-content, here expressed by a dative. 
Bronowski 2019, 425-426 maintains that the Stoics did not consider the combination of 
parakatêgorêmata (and implied less-than-parakatêgorêmata) with oblique case-contents as 
propositions (axiômata). Her reasons seem to be that Diogenes Laertius does not mention 
parakatêgorêmata and that they do not occur in Stoic arguments in our surviving evidence. These 
seem to us to be insufficient reasons. No source directly supports Bronowski’s claim that propositions 
cannot be constituted from parakatêgorêmata and oblique case-contents. On the contrary, Ammonius 
refers to the combination of any species of predicate (κατηγόρημα, παρακατηγόρημα, ἔλαττον ἢ 
κατηγόρημα, and ἔλαττον ἢ παρασύμβαμα) with one or more cases as ‘that which we assert’ 
(apophansis) (Ammon. Int. 44.19-45.6); cf. the Stoic definition of the proposition (axiôma) as that 
saying which we assert (apophainesthai) (DL 7.66).  
54
 DL 7.64 seems to report that some katêgorêmata are sumbamata and some are parasumbamata (if 
we follow the most common emendation of the text). Later sources associate sumbamata with 
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we will see that the distinction between sumbama and parasumbama is relevant to the 
structure of Stoic propositions: in its absence, propositions would be ambiguous, which is 
incompatible with Stoic theory.) 
 
4. Stoic polyadic predicates 
4.1 We have argued that the Stoic katêgorêmata are best understood as the Stoic 
analogues to monadic predicates and we have noted how advanced this Stoic notion is as a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
katêgorêmata and for parasumbamata we find the new term ‘parakatêgorêma’ (see §4.1 for some of 
those texts). Parasumbamata in those later sources are completed with an oblique case-content. The 
third definition of katêgorêma (text (D), DL.7.64) entails that katêgorêmata require an upright case-
content to generate a proposition. So are or aren’t both sumbamata and parasumbamata 
katêgorêmata? We offer two alternative answers. (1) For Chrysippus and some of his successors, both 
count as katêgorêmata. At some later point, the associations just mentioned are introduced, and 
parasumbamata are no longer katêgorêmata, but are parakatêgorêmata. The definitions in DL 7.64 
are assumed to be in chronological order (Atherton 1994, 253 fn. 31). The first two definitions allow 
for parasumbamata as a subclass of katêgorêmata. The third one reflects the later associations, in 
which the notion of katêgorêma has narrowed. (2) The Stoics distinguished between a generic and a 
specific sense of monadic predicate (katêgorêma): in the specific sense it does not include 
parasumbamata or parakatêgorêmata; in the generic sense, it does. This distinction differs 
substantially from Gaskin’s, above fn.34. (It is quite possible that the content of the expressions 
‘sumbama’ and ‘parasumbama’ changed somewhat over time, and started out related to the causative 
aspect of katêgorêmata, but we disregard this point here, since evidence is too scarce for reasonable 
conjecture. Generally, the status of the pair of expressions sumbama/parasumbama and their 
relationship to the pair katêgorêma/parakatêgorêma is not at all clear-cut, and several of the sources 
seem confused.  However, the specific historical and textual difficulties are not relevant to our topic, 
i.e. multiple generality.) 
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logical notion, from the perspective of contemporary first-order logic. It is generally assumed 
that the lack of a solution to the problem of multiple generality in traditional Aristotelian 
logic is in part due to the absence of polyadic predicates. So, the obvious next question is 
whether the Stoics had dyadic and generally polyadic predicates. In fact, for the nontrivial 
manifestation of multiple generality dyadic predicates are necessary. And in fact, they had. It 
is multiply documented that the Stoics distinguished between katêgorêmata and certain 
incomplete contents that they referred to as less-than-katêgorêmata.
55
  
(H) And again, if what is predicated of a noun requires addition of a case of a noun to 
produce an assertion, it is called (or said to be) less than a katêgorêma, as in the case 
of «loves» and «favours», for example «Plato loves». For, only if who is added to this, 
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 Less-than-katêgorêmata are also mentioned in Stephanus, Int. 11.18-21; Apoll.Dysc., On Syntax 
3.402-403; Stobaeus Ecl. 2.76; and Scholia to Lucian, Vit Auct. (27) 21.56-60. These texts are of 
different levels of reliability (see fn. 57). Other than Stobaeus, all contain later ancient Peripatetic or 
Platonist terminology and conflate the levels of signifiers and signified. 
56
 καὶ πάλιν ἂν μὲν τὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος κατηγορούμενον δέηται προσθήκης πτώσεως ὀνόματός τινος 
πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἀπόφανσιν, ἔλαττον ἢ κατηγόρημα λέγεται, ὡς ἔχει τὸ φιλεῖ καὶ τὸ εὐνοεῖ, οἷον 
‘Πλάτων φιλεῖ’ τούτῳ γὰρ προστεθὲν τὸ τινά, οἷον Δίωνα, ποιεῖ ὡρισμένην ἀπόφανσιν τὴν ‘Πλάτων 
Δίωνα φιλεῖ’. 
57
 The Ammonius passage (from which (H) and (B) above are excerpted) explicitly says that it reports 
Stoic theory, and indicates the beginning and end of that report. It uses Stoic terminology and 
canonical Stoic examples. It is not a fragment taken from an early Stoic text, since it intersperses 
comparison with Peripatetic theory and repeatedly conflates the Stoic distinction between content and 
linguistic expression. On the passage and its reliability see also Barnes 1999, 205; Gaskin 1997, 95; 
and Long and Sedley 1987, v.2 203-204. There are six surviving parallels to this passage: Stephanus, 
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The contrast is between katêgorêmata ((B) above) and less-than-katêgorêmata. A katêgorêma 
plus a noun (or rather a case-content expressed by a noun, DL 7.64, 70, §2) yields a complete 
content. An incomplete content that in addition to requiring an upright case-content, requires 
an oblique case-content to yield a complete content, is not a katêgorêma. It is less than a 
katêgorêma in the sense that a katêgorêma needs one noun-content for producing a 
proposition, whereas a less-than-katêgorêma needs (at least) two.   
As others noticed, these less-than-katêgorêmata are perfect candidates for Stoic 
dyadic predicates (Barnes 1999, 205-206). (H) could be a passage in a contemporary logic 
textbook that explains dyadic predicates: The student may expect «Plato loves» to be a 
katêgorêma, but it is not. Just as «… is walking» requires «Socrates» for completion, so 
«Plato loves …» still requires something, for instance «Dio», for completion. «loves» and 
«favours» have two argument places. Our texts are very clear that this is how the Stoics 
conceived of them. ‘They call it less than a katêgorêma, because it is not a complete 
katêgorêma.’
58
 The Stoic standard form is upright case-content (...), followed by an oblique 
case-content (/---), followed by less-than-a-katêgorêma; with F for ‘loves’: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Int. 11.2-21; Anon. Int. 3.6-17; Apoll.Dysc., On Syntax 3.402-403; Apoll.Dysc., On Syntax 3.429; 
Apoll.Dysc., On Pronouns 115.9-13; and Scholia to Lucian, Vit Auct. (27) 21.56-60. Cf. also Priscian, 
Inst. Gram. 18.4; and Suda s.v. sumbama. Most are less reliable than Ammonius. The distinction 
between katêgorêmata and less-than-katêgorêmata is recorded more or less accurately in all of these: 
see esp. Stephanus, Int. 11.2-21, Apoll.Dysc., On Syntax 3.155, and the Scholia to Lucian, Vit. Auct. 
See also Gaskin 1997, 106. Bronowski 2019, 429, assumes without argument that less-than-
katêgorêmata are katêgorêmata, something we do not find plausible.  
58
 Cf. e.g. ‘... but «Socrates loves», since the ‘whom’ is missing even though the subject is taken in the 
upright, [that is] since the proposition is not complete, they call it less than a katêgorêma, because it is 
not a complete katêgorêma.’ (τὴν δὲ Σωκράτης φιλεῖ, ἐπειδὴ λείπει τὸ τίνα, κἂν κατ’ εὐθεῖαν ἐλήφθη 
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(9)  ...  /---F  
With individual variables and F for ‘loves’ this corresponds roughly to the contemporary 
(10)  Fxy 
Some (probably early) Stoics applied the notion of less-than-katêgorêmata when 
explaining Zeno’s and Cleanthes’ views of the end or telos.
59
  Here ‘to live in agreement 
(with)’ is said to be something less <than a> katêgorêma, which (so the text implies) becomes 
a katêgorêma if ‘with nature’ (têi phusei) is added as second argument, namely ‘to live in 
agreement with nature’. This application of ‘less than a katêgorêma’ in conjunction with its 
definition and the descriptions as ‘less than a katêgorêma’ and ‘not a complete katêgorêma’ 
suggest that the early Stoics conceived of katêgorêmata and less-than-katêgorêmata as 
‘nested’ functions. First the (non-subject) argument place in less-than-katêgorêmata is filled 
(from Fxy to Fxa). This yields a (complete) katêgorêma (Fxa). Then the subject-argument-
place is filled (from Fxa to Fba). This yields a complete content.
60
 In our Stoic notation, this 
is from ... /---F to  ... /aF to b /aF, filled from inside out. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
ὁ ὑποκείμενος, ἀλλ’ οὖν, ἐπεὶ μὴ αὐτοτελὴς ἡ πρότασις, ἔλαττον ἢ κατηγόρημά φασιν αὐτήν, ὅτι μὴ 
τέλειόν ἐστι κατηγόρημα). Scholia to Lucian, Vit. Auct. (27) 21.54-58. 
59
 Arius in Stobaeus Ecl. II.7.6, tr. Long and Sedley modified: ‘Zeno rendered the end as: “living in 
agreement”... His successors, further articulating this, expressed it thus: “living in agreement with 
nature”, since they took what Zeno said to be less <than a> predicate. Cleanthes ... added “with 
nature”, and rendered it thus: “the end is living in agreement with nature”.’ (Τὸ δὲ τέλος ὁ μὲν Ζήνων 
οὕτως ἀπέδωκε, τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν... Οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτον, διαρθροῦντες, οὕτως ἐξέφερον, 
ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν· ὑπολαβόντες ἔλαττον εἶναι <ἢ> κατηγόρημα τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος 
ῥηθέν. Κλεάνθης γὰρ... προσέθηκε τῇ φύσει, καὶ οὕτως ἀπέδωκε, τέλος ἐστὶ τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ 
φύσει ζῆν.) Stobaeus’ excerpts from Arius are a very reliable source for early Stoic theory. 
60
 Could it not be the other way about, from Fxy to Fya to Fba? Possible but unlikely. The Stoics had 
a term for the Fxa analogue (katêgorêma). They do not offer one for a Fya analogue. «… loves Dio» 
 27 
Consistent with their distinction between event predicates (sumbamata) and 
secondary-event predicates (parasumbamata) (§3), the Stoics also defined less-than-
secondary-event-predicates. The latter stand to secondary-event predicates as less-than-
katêgorêmata stand to katêgorêmata. A Stoic example is ‘cares for’ (‘to ... for --- there is 
care’), completed as ‘Socrates cares for Alcibiades’, with G for ‘cares for’:
 61
  
(11) /...  /---G 
Evidently, these are also dyadic predicates. The contemporary analogue, with G for ‘cares 
for’ is 
(12) Gxy  
We have been unable to find examples in which both argument places are filled with 
the same argument, e.g. Dio loves Dio (Δίων Δίωνα φιλεῖ), but we keep looking. The Stoic 
definitions of their two kinds of dyadic predicates are compatible with the same argument 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
is a (complete) katêgorêma, more precisely an upright (or active) one. There is no analogue term in 
Stoic theory for «Plato loves…». The purpose of passage (H) is to make it clear why it would be 
wrong to think of «loves» as a katêgorêma; it would be wrong since «Plato loves…» is not a 
proposition; i.e. application of the definition of katêgorêma (as defined in text (A)) fails. This 
reasoning in (H) says nothing about the order of logical construction. The fact that «loves» is ‘not a 
complete katêgorêma’ (fn. 58) plus the Stobaeus passage (fn. 59) strongly suggests that you go from 
something that is not a complete katêgorêma to something that is a complete katêgorêma (of the kind 
we have in §§2 and 3) and from there to a proposition. 
61
 Thus Ammon. Int. 45.3-5, tr. Barnes modified: ‘If what is predicated of a case-content (ptôsis) 
needs to be put together with another oblique case-content to make an assertion, it is said to be less 
than a secondary-event predicate: thus ‘there is care’ e.g. ‘to Socrates for Alcibiades there is care’’ 
(i.e. ‘Socrates cares for Alcibiades’). (ἂν δὲ τὸ τῆς πτώσεως κατηγορούμενον ᾖ τὸ δεόμενον ἑτέρᾳ 
συνταχθῆναι πλαγίᾳ πτώσει πρὸς τὸ ποιῆσαι ἀπόφανσιν, ἔλαττον ἢ παρασύμβαμα λέγεται, ὡς ἔχει τὸ 
μέλει, οἷον ‘Σωκράτει Ἀλκιβιάδου μέλει’.) See further discussion in Barnes 1999, 205.  
 28 
filling both argument places. As analogy, we offer that in Stoic definitions of non-simple 
propositions it is stated that the same proposition can be used twice, e.g. p  p (SE M 8.93), 
and in their theory of indemonstrables, arguments of the form p  p, p => p count as first 
indemonstrables just as those of form p  q, p => q (Barnes et al 1999, 136). Since none of 
this is compelling, we leave the question open.
62
  
4.2 Next we argue that in the Stoic view less-than-katêgorêmata could take Stoic 
quantifying expressions (tis, tis-ekeinos) instead of individual constants in either argument 
place. With the definitions of the three kinds of simple affirmative propositions in mind (§3) 
we expect this.
63
 The illustrations of less-than-katêgorêmata contain only proper names. 
There are several Stoic examples of what are likely to be Stoic polyadic predicates that have 
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 Arguably, someone’s killing oneself, cutting one’s own hair, etc. are different kinds of relations 
from someone’s killing someone else, cutting someone else’s hair (try it!), etc. The general 
assumption in contemporary first-order logic that one can fill all argument places with the same 
argument seems natural if, like Frege, one uses mathematical examples when introducing functions 
with two arguments (Frege 1891, 27-8). It is not essential to the notion of a polyadic predicate.  
63
 The extant definitions of ‘being less than a katêgorêma’ (texts in fns. 56, 58) use non-Stoic 
terminology for the arguments: onoma, ptôseôs onomatos, etc., whereas DL 7.70 has the Stoic orthê 
ptôsis, deiktikê orthê ptôsis, and aoriston morion.  
 29 
indefinite parts in subject place.
64
 Perhaps most valuable is this Stoic example of a plausible 
proposition, which will engage us repeatedly:
65
  
 (I)  A proposition is plausible if it provokes assent, for example «If someone gave 
birth to something, then she is its mother».
66
 (DL 7.75)   
(The sentence that expresses the proposition in (I) is what linguists call an if-clause donkey 
sentence.
67
) In its ‘antecedent’, the proposition in (I) gives an illustration of a proposition that 
contains a (potential) two-place predicate with two indefinite particles as arguments: ‘gave 
birth to’ with ‘someone’ and ‘something’. In form, this predicate is analogous to 
(13) Fxy 
In Stoic terms «… to --- gave birth» would be less than a katêgorêma. It appears then that in 
the Stoic view less-than-katêgorêmata could take Stoic quantifying expressions along with 
individual constants or demonstratives in either argument place. So the Stoics had the kind of 
notion of dyadic predicate that is required for multiple generality.  
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 ‘If some god tells you that this one will be rich, this one will be rich.’ (SE M 8.308, Greek in fn. 69) 
combines indefinite part, case-content and demonstrative case-content. The Chrysippean-based ‘if 
someone was born in the sign of Sirius, that one will not die at sea’ (Cicero Fat. 12-14), arguably 
contains ‘born in the sign of’ and ‘will die (at)’, ‘When someone is in Megara, he is not in Athens’ 
might have been thought to contain ‘is in’. 
65
 A plausible proposition (pithanon axiôma) is a Stoic proposition that inclines us towards assent, 
even if false (DL 7.75). Cf. the Chrysippean book title: On plausible conditionals (DL 7.190), which 
suggests examples like the one in text (I) may originate with Chrysippus. See also Barnes 1985. 
66
 DL 7.75: εἴ τίς τι ἔτεκεν, ἐκείνη ἐκείνου μήτηρ ἐστί.  
67
 Donkey sentences contain a pronoun whose anaphoric reference is intuitively clear but whose 
syntactic function escapes straightforward linguistic analysis. A standard example is ‘Every man who 
owns a donkey beats it’, see e.g. Geach 1962. An if-clause donkey sentence is a donkey sentence that 
starts with an if-clause instead of e.g. a universal quantifying expression.  
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4.3. Logicians are bound to ask at this point: What about (analogues to) predicates with more 
than two argument places? Alas, no Stoic source explicitly mentions or discusses such 
cases.
68
 The Stoics could have easily defined three-or-more-place predicates recursively on 
the basis of their definition of dyadic predicates. For the term of a three-place predicate, the 
phrase ‘less-than-a’ could be prefixed to ‘less-than-a-katêgorêma’. Generally, if a (less-than-
a)
n
-katêgorêma is a polyadic predicate, then a (less-than-a)
n+1
-katêgorêma is a polyadic 
predicate. We could also say that a (less-than-a)
n
-katêgorêma is the analogue to an (n+1)-
place predicate, with n0. This is not that farfetched: the Stoics use iterative definitions in 
many parts of their logic. Conjunctive propositions are said to consist of two propositions and 
a conjunctive connective (DL 7.72) and negations are defined as propositions that start with 
the prefix ‘not:’ (Apul. Herm. 191.6-11; SE M 8.103; cf. SE M 8.89; DL 7.73). This accounts 
for conjunctive and negative propositions of any complexity (Barnes et al. 1999, 105-106). 
Still, there is no direct proof that the Stoics defined three-or-more-place predicates. What 
about the following Stoic example?  
(J) If some god tells you that this one will be rich, this one will be rich.
69
 (SE M 
8.308, cf. PH 2.141, italics ours)  
Does it not contain a predicate «...  tells --- that *** will be rich», representable as  
(14)   ...  /--- ***H 
and analogous in form to the contemporary  
(15) Hxyz ?     
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 Some may think that the second Stoic definition of katêgorêma (text (D)) attests a generic use of 
katêgorêma and refers to possible argument places (above §2). Accordingly they may suggest that 
such polyadic predicates would be covered. We have argued (above §2) that (D) should not be read in 
this way.  
69
 SE M 8.308: εἴ τίς σοι θεῶν εἶπεν ὅτι πλουτήσει οὗτος, πλουτήσει οὗτος. 
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We doubt it: one would expect the Stoics to have treated indirect speech differently (cf. the 
function of ‘said’ in the Stoic unmethodical arguments, e.g. Alex. An. Pr. 22.17-26). Clear 
evidence for Stoic three-or-more-place predicates is thus absent. Of course, for a logic to 
contain multiple generality and to reflect on its problems, dyadic predicates suffice entirely.  
 
5. Variable-free predicate logic: monadic predicate logic   
The Stoics have no individual variables. (The question whether they had propositional 
variables is of no concern here.) A fortiori, they have no variable-binding quantifiers. We are 
looking at a variable-free predicate logic. Such a thing is not unknown in contemporary 
logic. Quine’s short and splendid paper ‘Variables explained away’ provides a method that 
allows one to replace Frege-style individual variables and quantifiers by a set of operators.  
The Stoics appear to distinguish between two kinds of indefinite propositions. The 
first is an analogue to contemporary existential propositions.  
(K) According to them (i.e. the Stoics), indefinite are those <propositions> in which 
an indefinite part (morion) governs, such as «someone is sitting».
70
 (SE M 8.97) 
(L) An indefinite [simple proposition] is one that is composed from an indefinite part 
... and <a katêgorêma>, such as «someone is walking» ... .
71
 (DL 7.70) 
This first kind of indefinite proposition is composed of one indefinite part
72
 and a monadic 
predicate. The indefinite part governs, that is has widest scope, in these propositions. Given 
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 SE M 8.97: ἀόριστα δέ ἐστι κατ’ αὐτοὺς ἐν οἷς ἀόριστόν τι κυριεύει μόριον, οἷον τὶς κάθηται. 
71
 DL 7.70: ἀόριστον δέ ἐστι τὸ συνεστὸς ἐξ ἀορίστου μορίου ... καὶ κατηγορήματος, οἷον τὶς 
περιπατεῖ, ... . We accept von Arnim’s addition of <καὶ κατηγορήματος>, an emendation which seems 
uncontested. 
 32 
the Stoic Scope Principle (§1), ‘someone’ (or ‘something’) is thus the characterizing 
expression in sentences that signify these indefinite propositions. The examples in (K) and 
(L) are examples of such indefinite simple propositions. With  for the indefinite part, we can 
represent their (Stoic) form as  
(16)  F 
The contemporary analogue is  
(17) x Fx 
This is confirmed by the explanation of why indefinite propositions are indefinite 
(M) «Someone is walking» is indefinite, since it does not demarcate any one of the 
particular walking individuals. For, it can generally be expressed in the presence of 
any of the particular walking individuals.
73
 (SE M 8.97) 
We understand (M) as conveying that indefinite propositions do not refer. The reason is that 
they do not pick out any particular person or thing, since they can be – truthfully – expressed 




                                                                                                                                                                                    
72
 Texts (K) and (L) imply that the indefinite morion is part of the proposition and hence at the level 
of content.  We translate morion as ‘part’ and use ‘particle’ for the corresponding linguistic 
expression. There is no Stoic equivalent to this distinction, it is merely for clarity. 
73
 SE M 8.97: τὸ μὲν οὖν “τὶς περιπατεῖ” ἀόριστόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἀφώρικέ τινα τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους 
περιπατούντων· κοινῶς γὰρ ἐφ’ ἑκάστου αὐτῶν ἐκφέρεσθαι δύναται· (‘in the presence of’: LSJ s.v. 
ἐπί A.1.2.e; alternatively ‘on the basis of’ LSJ s.v. ἐπί A.1.2.f). 
74
 As noted above, Stoic referring expressions appear to have a ‘case-content’ (ptôsis) at the content 
level. Proper names, demonstratives and nouns (in certain functions) each have a corresponding 
ptôsis. For demonstratives, they are called ‘demonstrative case-contents’. The particles tis and tis-
ekeinos have corresponding ‘indefinite parts’ (aorista moria) at the content level. No indefinite ptôsis 
 33 
Non-reference is confirmed by the Stoic truth conditions for simple (affirmative) 
existential indefinite propositions. The indefinite proposition «Someone is walking» is said to 
be true precisely if the corresponding definite proposition («this one is walking» 
accompanied by an indicating of a specific person) is true (SE M 8.98).
75
 (By a 
corresponding definite or middle proposition we mean henceforward a proposition that 
differs from the indefinite proposition at issue only in that it has a case-content or 
demonstrative case-content in place of an indefinite part.) We can confidently conclude that 
the indefinite propositions of form (16) are Stoic existential propositions with monadic 
predicates and one quantifier expression. We call them monadic indefinite existential 
propositions. 
The second kind of indefinite proposition is somewhat harder to pin down. Based on 
what we said about the Stoic notion of monadic predicate, we argue that the full sentence 
behind (L) also provides an example of a monadic indefinite universal proposition. This 
requires a close look at that full sentence.  
(N) An indefinite [simple proposition] is one that is composed from an indefinite part 
or indefinite parts and <a katêgorêma>, such as «someone is walking», « <if someone 
is walking>, he is moving».
76
 (DL 7.70, continuation of (L)) 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
or case-content is ever mentioned. Neither ‘tis’ nor the anaphoric ‘ekeinos’ (for which see below) nor 
the combination of the two are ever called ptôsis in Stoic texts. See also Crivelli 1994a, 189. 
75
 A definite proposition is true if that which is pointed at falls under the predicate (SE M 8.100). The 
account of the truth conditions of indefinite propositions leads to well-known problems for certain 
Stoic propositions, such as «someone is dead» and «this one is dead», which we can here ignore, see 
for a variety of interpretation Barnes et al. 1999, 98-101; Bailey 2014, 281-284; Durand 2019, §§ 29-
34; Bronowski 2019, 415-8. 
76
 DL 7.70: ἀόριστον δέ ἐστι τὸ συνεστὸς ἐξ ἀορίστου μορίου ἢ ἀορίστων μορίων <καὶ 
κατηγορήματος>, οἷον τὶς περιπατεῖ, <εἰ τὶς περιπατεῖ,> ἐκεῖνος κινεῖται. More literally, ἐκεῖνος 
 34 
We assume that the second example is of the second kind, that is, an indefinite simple 
proposition with more than one indefinite part and a monadic predicate. We agree with and 
adopt (in (N)) an emendation that assumes a textual lacuna by – very plausible – 
haplography.
77
 Then we have as second example  
(18) «If someone is walking, he is moving.» 
It contains the indefinite parts ‘someone’, which is non-anaphoric, and ‘that one’, which is 
anaphoric with cross-reference to the first indefinite part.
78
 The result is, in a well-attested 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
κινεῖται translates as ‘that one is moving’. Since we argue (below) that the regimented sentences that 
express universal propositions use forms of ἐκεῖνος as anaphoric pronouns, the natural translation in 
English is with a personal pronoun. (Here we follow Crivelli 1994a.) This has the additional 
advantage that elements of case and gender in the Greek can be rendered directly. In some cases in 
which it increases clarity, we render ‘that one’.  
77
 The text without emendation is highly puzzling. Cf. the detailed fn. Frede 1974, 59-60 and Crivelli 
1994a, 189: ‘One wonders why both examples offered by Diogenes are simple indefinite propositions 
consisting of one indefinite particle and one predicate, whilst no example is given of a simple 
indefinite proposition consisting of more than one indefinite particle and one predicate.’ The 
emendation was suggested by Egli 1981, in conjunction with an alternative to von Arnim’s 
emendation (fn. 71 above), which we do not adopt, and which does not change the sense of the 
definition as given here. Egli’s emendation is also adopted by Hülser 1987-8 p 1142 (= FDS 914). 
Crivelli tries to make sense of the text by stipulating a Stoic distinction between anaphoric and non-
anaphoric simple indefinite propositions (1994a, 189). However, no texts attest such a distinction, and 
we consider the conjecture of anaphoric simple indefinite propositions philosophically awkward. 
78
 Kneale & Kneale 1962, 146 suggest that ekeinos must be anaphoric, cross-referring to an 
antecedent in a conditional. We do not claim that the Stoics considered occurrences of ekeinos 
without a preceding form of tis in a preceding clause as anaphoric. (That would be silly.) Equally do 
we not consider the fact that, in a work on psychology in a strange etymological explanation of ‘egô’ 
 35 
canonical form, what the Stoics call an indefinite conditional. Of these a good number of 
examples survive.
79
 The very same example is also attested in Augustine Dial. 3, which is 
based on Stoic logic.
80
 (It speaks in favour of the emendation that it results in a Stoic 
canonical formulation and a known Stoic example.)  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
utilized to corroborate the Stoic placement of the mind in the heart, Chrysippus implies that ekeinos 
has a demonstrative use (Gal. Plac. Hipp. Plat. 2.2.7-12) as detrimental to the claim that in logic the 
Stoics regimented the use of the pair tis / ekeinos in such a way that it counted as a pair of indefinite 
part(icles) in which the second part does anaphoric duty: The pair of particles works together as a 
unit, just like the Stoic pairs of connectives kai ... kai--- and êtoi ... ê---. See also Crivelli 1994a. 196; 
Caston 1999, 196-7; Durand 2019, §§43-5, 51-4. We note that ekeinos seems never to occur in 
demonstrative function in the many demonstrative examples in Stoic logic.  
79
 For some of them see Cic. Fat. 15; DL 7.75; SE M 11.8-13, three examples, for helpful discussion 
of which see Crivelli 1994b, 498. Cf. also Cic. Acad. 2.20-21; SE M 1.86; Plutarch, Com. Not. 1080c. 
Epict., Diss. 2.20.2-3 seems to provide evidence as to the reformulation of a negative universal, ‘No F 
is G’. Cf. Crivelli 1994a, n. 36. 
80
 Cf. the conditionals mentioned at DL 7.78, «If Dio is walking, Dio is moving» (with an uncontested 
emendation by von Armin); and Gell. 16.8.9 «If Plato is walking, Plato is moving». Consistent with 
the standard practice in Stoic logic, these conditionals are offered as stock examples and are assumed 
true. We argue that (N) provides (18) as another stock example of a true conditional, but now one that 
is indefinite. Simple probability calculations show that this is more likely than that we have «someone 
is walking» and «that one is moving» as two isolated examples, which just happen to form a familiar 
stock example when put together. Cf. SE M 8.100, where «someone is walking» and «someone is 
sitting» are given as two isolated examples of indefinite propositions. 
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It is often assumed that the indefinite conditionals are Stoic non-simple propositions, 
more precisely, conditionals (sunêmmena).
81
 (Recall that Stoic propositions are either simple 
or non-simple, §1.) This is however both implausible and problematic. Nor is it entailed by 
the name: ‘indefinite’ may function as an alienans adjective. It is implausible, since the 
Stoics, in their language regimentation, required that in a proper conditional the subject 
expression of the antecedent sentence be repeated in the consequent sentence, if the subject is 
the same; e.g. “If Plato lives, then Plato breathes”. The practise (we call it anaphora removal) 
applies to all non-simple propositions and is often, though not uniformly, followed in the 
sources.
82
 It ensures that it is discernible at the sentence level that we have two independent 
simple propositions that are combined in accordance with the Stoic definition of a conditional 
into a non-simple one. It becomes thus discernible that the consequent is detachable e.g. with 
a Stoic first indemonstrable, which has the form of modus ponens. The relevant non-simple 
proper conditional, composed of two simple indefinite propositions, is this conditional  
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 So Frede 1974, 59 fn. 11; Goulet 1978, 205; Crivelli 1994a, 198-199; Bobzien 1998, 156-159. 
Exceptions are Durand 2018, 167-169, Frede 1974, 64-7 (not entirely clear) and possibly Long and 
Sedley 1987, v.1, 207 (not entirely clear either). 
82
 Cf. e.g. DL 7.77, 78, 80; SE M 8. 246, 252, 254, 305, 308, 423; SE PH 2. 105, 106, 141; 
Gell.16.8.9; Gal. Inst.Log. iv.1; Simp. Phys. 1300; Alex. An.Pr. 345, Cic. Fat 12. No surviving 
ancient source explicitly discusses the Stoic convention of anaphora removal. We believe that the 
frequency with which anaphora removal occurs, together with the fact that it sounds as unidiomatic 
and is as rare in ancient Greek as in English, are sufficient evidence.  It is likely that because it is not 
idiomatic in some cases in which this regimentation is not followed, these are scribal changes; and 
that for the same reason in other, especially later ancient cases, some authors are unaware of the 
convention and disregard it. See Barnes et al. 1999, 104-105 for discussion of Stoic anaphora 
removal. 
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(19) If someone is walking, someone is moving.
83
   
(19) satisfies the Stoic definition of conditionals as non-simple propositions that are 
composed with the conditional connective ‘if’ (DL 7.71). By contrast, Stoic indefinite 
conditionals resist anaphora removal and neither do they satisfy the definition of the 
conditional, nor is it possible to detach their ‘consequent’ with modus ponens. It would be 
absurd to assume that the Stoics did not see the difference between (18) and (19). And there 
is evidence that they did see it.
84
   
The assumption that the indefinite conditionals are non-simple is problematic, since 
the Stoics would be shown to be unaware not just of the difference between the sentences 
expressing (18) and (19), but more generally between conditionals and universal 
propositions. (For example, in terms of traditional Fregean-Russellian logic, in (19) the 
conditional connective has wide scope, in (18) the universally quantifying indefinite parts 
do.) That they were not unaware of this, is clear from the fact that in the Stoic view 
(20) If something is human, it is a mortal, rational animal. 
expresses a universal proposition (katholikon [axiôma]), in this case a definition, and 
someone who utters (20) says the same proposition as someone who utters    
(21) (Every) human is a mortal rational animal.
85
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 Cf. Barnes et al. 1999, 112, also Egli 2000, 20-21. 
84
 Cic. Fat. 15, see Bobzien 1998, 156-159. Egli 2000, 20-21 argues plausibly that the Stoic solution 
to the Nobody Paradox shows that the Stoics distinguished between a pair of sentences similar to (18) 
and (19).  
85
 SE M 11.8: ‘for the one saying “Man is a mortal rational animal” says the same thing in meaning, 
though different in expression, as the one saying “if something is a man, it is a mortal rational 
animal”’. (ὁ γὰρ εἰπὼν “ἄνθρωπός ἐστι ζῷον λογικὸν θνητόν” τῷ εἰπόντι “εἴ τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, 
ἐκεῖνο ζῷόν ἐστι λογικὸν θνητόν” τῇ μὲν δυνάμει τὸ αὐτὸ λέγει, τῇ δὲ φωνῇ διάφορον.) What is said 
(legei) is the proposition (e.g. DL 7.66). Hence those two speakers say the same proposition. The 
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In (21), and according to the Stoic Scope Principle, ‘every’ would have largest scope.
86
 Given 
the stated synonymy of (20) and (21), ‘something ... it ...’ must have largest scope in (20). 
Accordingly, in our Stoic examples, the two-particle quantifying expression always has each 
part as far to the front of its clause as is possible. For the Stoics, (21) expresses a simple 
proposition, and with (20) and (21) one says the same proposition. But the same proposition 
cannot be both simple and non-simple. Hence (20) and by generalization (18) and Stoic 
indefinite conditionals generally, express simple propositions. As such, they should consist of 
indefinite parts and a predicate (DL 7.70, above). This is exactly what they consist of. The 
indefinite parts ‘something’ and ‘it’ work together as a unit (just like the parts ‘either ... or 
...’, ‘and ... and ...’ in non-simple propositions (§1)).  The remainder of the content  
(22) «If ... is walking, ... is moving»   
is a monadic predicate by the definition of monadic predicate (katêgorêma). We have 
evidence that the Stoics, Chrysippus in particular, had that sort of predicate (above (4), (5)). 
The logical form of the propositions (and the regimented sentences expressing them) can then 
be represented as  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
following sentence (SE M 11. 9) leaves no doubt that the singular noun without article ‘man’ is 
understood universally, as covering every man (i.e. human being). For katholikon used for an 
indefinite conditional cf. SE M 1.86; Epict. Diss. 2.20.2-3, Plut. Com. Not. 1080c; see also Crivelli 
1994a fn. 36 and Caston 1999, 195-199, esp. 197.  
86
 Note the example SE M 11.10-11: ‘For the person who carries out a division in this manner, 
“among human beings, some are Greeks and some are barbarians [i.e. non-Greek speakers]” says 
something equal to “if some things are human, they either are Greeks or are barbarians”. (ὁ γὰρ τρόπῳ 
τῷδε διαιρούμενος “τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μέν εἰσιν Ἕλληνες, οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι” ἴσον τι λέγει τῷ “εἰ τινές 
εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι, ἐκεῖνοι ἢ Ἕλληνές εἰσιν ἢ βάρβαροι”.) Here the leading expression ‘among human 
beings’ (τῶν ἀνθρώπων) has widest scope. This also shows that the Stoics consider such propositions 
with a generic noun without article as subject expression as a universal proposition of sorts.   
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(23) Conditional conjunction + indefinite particle (i) ( + cases) + finite verb + 
corresponding anaphoric particle (i) ( + cases) + finite verb. 
We always assume that any Stoic regimentation is (in Greek) grammatically correct. In 
contemporary symbolism with variables (22) has the form of a monadic predicate 
(24) FxGx 
and the indefinite proposition (18) has the form 
(25) x (Fx  Gx)    
So we can make sense of a perplexing Stoic definition with examples (in (N)) if (i) we accept 
a very plausible emendation that establishes a Stoic stock example in Stoic canonical form, 
and (ii) we then take the restored text to mean exactly what it says. This solves the 
conundrum of Stoic indefinite conditionals: They are not non-simple but simple propositions, 
just as the text implies. (iii) These are constructed with two indefinite parts that form a logical 
unit and have widest scope in the proposition plus a monadic predicate as defined by the 
Stoics for which we have evidence elsewhere.
87
  
There are then Stoic indefinite universal propositions to complement the Stoic 
indefinite existential propositions; both kinds are simple propositions.
88
 There is evidence for 
their semantics, too (SE M 11.8-13).
89
 It is based on what are called subordinate instances of 
universal propositions.
90
 These are themselves propositions: They can be false (ibid.), and 
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 For additional evidence that the Stoics were aware that indefinite conditionals were not non-simple 
propositions (and as such not the kind of conditionals as are part of propositional logic) see §9. 
88
 We do not here discuss the question whether the two are duals and interdefinable. For their 
negations see Barnes et al. 1999, 113-114, Egli 2000. 
89
 See also Crivelli 1994a, 193-4, 199-202; Barnes et al. 1999, 113; confirmed by DL 7.75, see below 
§6. 
90
 ὑποτασσομένου (SE M 11.11); ὑποταχθέντος (SE M 11.9). 
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accordingly, true. The instances are proper conditionals with definite (or middle, see below 
§6) component propositions, in which the case-content is the same in both component 
propositions. If there can be a false subordinate instance, the indefinite universal is false. We 
infer that if there cannot be any false subordinate instances, the indefinite universal is true.  
Why ‘cannot be any’ and not ‘are no’? We assume that the ‘if’ in the universals, or 
indefinite conditionals, has the same logical strength as in the Stoic proper conditionals (cf. 
Cic. Fat 11-17, Bobzien 1998, 156-159.) This is also suggested by their name. So ‘can be’ is 
required by the – Chrysippean – truth conditions for Stoic conditionals, which contain a 
modal element: a conditional is true when its antecedent and the negation of its consequent 
are incompatible (DL 7.73). However, Chrysippus could and did also account for a kind of 
non-simple proposition that corresponds to material conditionals, i.e. to the Philonian 
conditional. He (and some other Stoics, it seems) used negations of conjunctions with the 
antecedent of a Philonian conditional as first conjunct and the contradictory of the consequent 
as second conjunct as the correct form of that Philonian conditional. (The Philonian 
conditionals are thus accurately rendered as truth-functional, since they are really negated 
conjunctions and Stoic negation and conjunction are both truth-functional.) Moreover, 
Chrysippus’ logic contained corresponding indefinite negations of conjunctions, too. We 
assume, by analogy to Chrysippean indefinite conditionals, that the Chrysippean negated 
conjunctions that replace Philonian conditionals are true when there are no false subordinate 
instances. (Cf. Cic. Fat 11-17 and Bobzien 1998, 156-159 on this point.) From a 
contemporary perspective, the Stoics have two kinds of universal propositions, one 
containing a modal element, the other being non-modal and truth-functional. For 
differentiation, we call them the Chrysippean universal and the ‘Philonian’ universal. (No 
such names are known from antiquity.). We generally consider Chrysippean conditionals and 
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Chrysippean indefinite conditionals as paradigm. The case for negated conjunctions is 
analogous, and we mention them only occasionally.   
Virtually all extant examples of Stoic universals are restricted universals in the sense 
that universal quantifiers have only conditionals or negated conjunctions in their immediate 
scope: Not ‘everyone is moving’, but ‘if someone is walking, that one is moving’ or ‘not: 
both someone is walking and not: that one is moving’. The closest to non-restricted 
universals is ‘if some things exist, those things either are good or are bad or are indifferent’.
91
 
(For the Stoics ‘existence’ (einai) is reserved to bodies, and so is narrower than the 
ontological category ‘something’ (ti), which includes both bodies and non-bodies.) Still, the 
example suffices to illustrate by analogy how unrestricted universals could be expressed 
within the Stoic framework: ‘if something is something, then that thing ...’ (ei ti ti estin, 
ekeinon…). If so, all Chrysippean universals could be expressed canonically in conditional 
form. Correspondingly, all ‘Philonian’ universals could be expressed canonically in the form 
of negated conjunctions (Cic. Fat 15-16). Very roughly, the first would correspond to the 
contemporary x (Fx   Gx),
92
  where ‘’ indicates whatever modal force Chrysippean 
indefinite universal conditionals have, and the second to x (Fx    Gx) or x (Fx  Gx), 
with ‘’ for material implication.  
Just as the indefinite part «someone» in Stoic existential propositions is non-referring 
(above), so are the indefinite parts «someone – that one». The relation between the existential 
and its correlated definite proposition has a parallel in the relation between the universal and 
its subordinated proper conditionals with the same referent for the subject expression in both 
component propositions. In the existential case, for truth, the presence of a true correlated 
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 SE M 11.11: εἴ τινά ἐστιν ὄντα, ἐκεῖνα ἤτοι ἀγαθά ἐστιν ἢ κακά ἐστιν ἢ ἀδιάφορα.  
92
 Why not x (Fx   Gx)? (i) The surviving argument form does not require it (below §§6 and 9). 
(ii) We believe the texts suggest that universal quantification has largest scope (below §7). 
 42 
definite is required. In the universal case, for truth, the absence of (the possibility of) a false 
subordinated conditional is required.   
We now return to Quine’s ‘Variables explained away’. Quine notes that in simple 
monadic existential predicates (corresponding to one occurrence of the variable), the variable 
can be dropped, and that ‘some (G) is F’ is a better formulation than ‘some (G) x is such that 
x is F’ (343). On the Stoic side, for such cases, the Scope Principle does all that is necessary. 
Position is marked by the indefinite part ‘someone/something’ and the desired monadic 
predicate is abstracted as being everything other than this part, as per the definition of 
indefinite propositions. So the Stoic ‘someone (or something) F’ (for short F, with ‘’ for 
tis, tinos, etc.) combines the existence prefix with the variable it binds  in modern terms 
‘(something x is such that x) F’. For Stoic monadic universal predicates, in variable-binding 
quantifier formulations the same variable occurs twice. Here the Scope Principle combined 
with anaphoric reference does all that is necessary. ‘(If) someone – that one’ combines 
marking the positions of (what would be) the two occurrences of the variable (one position is 
given by ‘someone’ the other by ‘that one’) with the analogue to the universality prefix 
‘everything x is such that’. We give the form of sentences expressing such propositions as iF 
  iG, where the predicate comes in the three parts , F and G, with ‘’ for the anaphoric 
expressions ekeinos, etc., and the anaphoric relation indicated by subscripts ‘i’, ‘k’, ... . 
Generally, in the two Stoic monadic cases, a combination of the Scope Principle and 
anaphoric reference suffices. Problems of multiple generality can occur only in indefinite 
propositions with more than one quantification.    
 
6. Variable free predicate logic: Polyadic predicate logic 
To see whether Stoic logic could handle the problem of multiple generality, we need 
to consider propositions with more than one quantifying expression. In keeping with the 
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evidence, we confine ourselves to dyadic predicates and propositions with two quantifying 
expressions. There are four such cases, in terms of modern quantifier expressions, , , 
, . All issues of ambiguities are postponed to §7 and §8. 
For the first two cases, consider again the Stoic if-clause donkey sentence from text 
(I). For our purpose it is preferable, here and below, to retain the Greek word order, even 
though in English it is unidiomatic and potentially cringe-inducing: 
(26)  «If someone (male/female) to something gave birth, then she of it is the mother».
93
    
The ‘antecedent’ provides us with a Stoic  proposition that contains a dyadic predicate 
(less-than-a-katêgorêma) 
(27) «Someone to something gave birth.»  
This appears to be the canonical or regimented positioning of the indefinite parts, parallel to 
that of the upright and oblique case-contents in middle propositions with dyadic predicates 
(§4). With F for ‘gave birth to’, the form of (27) is analogous to 
(28) xy Fxy     1  /2 F  
We have an explicit account of the Stoic truth-conditions for indefinites only for 
(affirmative) monadic existential indefinite propositions: ‘Someone is walking’ is true 
precisely if the corresponding definite proposition is true (SE M 8.98, §5 above, Crivelli 
1994a, 190-193). By simple generalization, we obtain convincing Stoic truth-conditions for 
dyadic (double) existential indefinite propositions, by which we mean those that contain a 
dyadic predicate and two indefinite expressions. The multiply general «Someone loves 
someone» is true if the corresponding doubly definite «This one (indicating a specific 
person) loves this one (indicating a specific person)» is true. Here there are two acts of 
indicating directed at two different people (cf. PHerc 307 Col. IV), or possibly at the same 
person. We use d, e, ... as individual constants in demonstrative atomic propositions that are 
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 DL 7.75: εἴ τίς τι ἔτεκεν, ἐκείνη ἐκείνου μήτηρ ἐστί.   
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accompanied by the relevant admissible acts of indicating. Then, in contemporary terms xy 
Fxy is true iff some Fde is true.  
What about the Stoic dyadic universals or  cases? It is realistic to assume that in 
(26) «... of --- is the mother» (using Greek word-order again) is also a dyadic predicate (less-
than-a-katêgorêma).
94
 As a whole, (26) then illustrates the Stoic version of a dyadic predicate 
with two restricted universal quantifications.
95
  The predicate «If ... to ---gave birth, ... of --- 
is the mother» is in form analogous to    
(29) Fxy  Gxy     ...  /---F  ...  /---G 
The proposition (26) includes two pairs of quantifying parts, ‘someone-she’ and ‘something-
it’, that take the two pairs of argument places. This is precisely what we expect from the 
monadic cases.
96
 The form of (26) is then analogous to   
(30) xy (Fxy  Gxy)
97
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 Note that the main clause ‘that one is mother to another one’ contains two anaphoric expressions 
without their referent-expressions, and as such does not express a Stoic proposition. It is not a 
complete content. 
95
 There are no examples of unrestricted universalization with two-place predicates (analogues to 
xy Fxy). However recall the universal proposition at SE M 11.11, discussed in §7 below: «if 
something exists, then it is either good or bad or indifferent». 
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 It also gives additional support to the DL 7.70 reading of ‘someone’ and ‘he’ (ekeinos) above §2. 
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 In our Stoicized symbolism: τi  /τkF   i  /kG,  with the regimented word order and τi for the first 
half of the indefinite (upright) part, i for the corresponding anaphoric second half, /τk for the first half 
of the indefinite oblique part, /k for the corresponding anaphoric oblique second half. It is of course 
not necessary that an upright first half has an upright anaphoric part, an oblique first half an oblique 
anaphoric part (see §8).  
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It is not clear if and how such propositions could be expressed with ‘every’ (as ‘if something 
is human it is mortal’ was said to be synonymous to ‘(every) human is mortal’ in the monadic 
case in §5) – not even if one resorts to acrobatic distortions of natural language.
98
 Thus here 
we have a logically motivated reason why the Stoics introduced the conditional form for 
expressing universal propositions: it is required when there are two universalizations in a 
proposition. Of course (26) is not what one would expect the restricted parallel to  
(31)  xy Fxy 
to be. Stoic dyadic predicates provide the material for a restricted version of (31), too. An 
example would be  
(32) If someoneτ1 is human and someoneτ2 is human, then theyε1 love themε2.
99
 
(33) xy ((Fx  Fy)  Gxy)  
Or, with the existence predicate E,  
(33a) If someone τ1 exists and someone τ2 exists, then theyε1 love themε2.  
(34) xy ((Ex  Ey)  Gxy).  
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 Cf. the well-known criticisms of the suppositio theories developed by Medieval logicians: Dummett 
1973, 8, and on ancient Aristotelian logic see Barnes, 2007 159-165. 
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 Perhaps as a regimented form for ‘some are human’ (τινες ἄνθρωποί εἰσιν), given Chrysippus’ 
interest in plurals, see fn. to (48). 
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 πᾶς ἄνθρωπος πάντα ἄνθρωπον φιλεῖ. Sentences expressing propositions like (32) and (33a) are 
known as bishop sentences, after Kamp (see Heim 1990, and for a brief exposition Elbourne 2010, 65-
68). Since no Stoic examples of this kind survive, we mention this only in passing and do not 
speculate about the Stoic take on their semantics. 
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We saw that there are no explicit accounts of the truth-conditions for Stoic monadic 
universal propositions, analogous in form to x(FxGx), but that there is sufficient evidence 
to reconstruct these: A monadic universal indefinite proposition is true precisely when there 
can be no false subordinate instances (§5). By generalization to dyadic universal indefinite 
propositions, a Stoic proposition analogous in form to xy(FxyGxy) should be true 
precisely when there can be no false subordinate instances of these: No FabGab can be 
false. In addition, we have an explicit semantic presentation of a counterexample invoked to 
show the falsehood of the plausible proposition (26). 
(O) But this is false. For it is not the case that the hen of an egg is the mother.
101
  
Here we have, implied, a sufficient condition for the falsehood of (26): Given the truth 
conditions for indefinite conditionals (see Barnes et al. 1999, 112-113; SE M 11.9-11), (26) is 
false because one of its subordinated non-indefinite conditionals is false, presumably: «if a 
hen to an egg gives birth, then a hen to an egg is a mother», following the example in (O). A 
necessary and sufficient condition for this non-indefinite Chrysippean conditional to be true 
is that it cannot have a true antecedent and a false consequent.
102
 This suggests that the truth 
conditions for (26) are that it cannot have a counterexample; and that (O) gives a 
counterexample in the form of a false subordinated instance. We assume that the same would 
be the case for propositions like (32) and (33a).  
 
7. Scope ambiguity  
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 DL 7.75, continuation of (I): ψεῦδος δὲ τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ὄρνις ᾠοῦ ἐστι μήτηρ. 
102
 Barnes et al. 1999, 106-108. We saw that for the truth of an indefinite proposition we may need the 
truth of a corresponding definite proposition (or partially definite proposition). As expected, for the 
demonstration by counterexample of the falsehood of a proposition, a corresponding middle 
proposition seems to suffice. 
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The kind of ambiguity that is standardly offered as evidence of the ingenuity of 
Frege’s quantifier logic is that of scope ambiguity in quantifying expressions (e.g. Dummett 
1973, 9-15). Since the order of two or more of the same quantifying expressions is considered 
immaterial in every logical respect (though see §8), such ambiguity is discerned when 
quantifying expressions are mixed.
103
 The most basic contemporary forms are yx Fyx and 
xy Fyx. The problem of multiple generality is often explained with examples of just these 
forms. ‘Everyone loves someone’ is the paradigm in the English language. Here ‘everyone’ 
may have wide or narrow scope. There are no surviving examples of Stoic propositions with 
mixed quantification, that is, of polyadic predicates that are governed by a mixture of 
existential and universal indefinite parts. At the same time, there is no reason to think that 
Stoic dyadic predicates exclude completions that generate propositions with mixed indefinite 
quantification. The only proviso is that, as in the case of monadic predicates, universal 
‘quantifying’ is usually restricted, and Stoic language regimentation would ask for expression 
in conditional form. Using what information there is on Stoic monadic existential and 
restricted universal quantifying, it is straightforward to (re)construct step by step the Stoic 
version of the mixed cases. The Greek for ‘Every human being loves someone’ has a scope 
ambiguity similar to the English. In this section we disregard anaphoric ambiguity. Our 
examples are deliberately chosen so as to avoid that issue.  Thus ancient Greek contains 
sentences equivalent in form to   
(35) Every man likes something.     
which start with the Greek for ‘every’ (pas). ((35) restricts only the universal, not the 
existential part.) Assume such a sentence is intended to express a Stoic proposition in which 
the universal part has wide scope. Then, in principle, the formulation with ‘every’ (pas) as 
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 In Stoic notation of dyadic universal propositions it is not immaterial which second half of a two-
part quantifying expression goes with which first half. See §§ 6 and 8. 
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first word would find Stoic approval because of their Scope Principle, that the first expression 
of a sentence indicates widest scope (see §1).
104
 Possibly because of the perceived ambiguity 
in (35) between Chrysippean and ‘Philonian’ universal (§6), the Stoics would advocate 
regimentation. For brevity, we here only consider the Chrysippean versions. So, the Stoic 
fully regimented form of such sentences as Chrysippean universals would almost certainly 
be: 
(36) If someone is a man, he likes something.
105
 
If someoneτ1 is a man, he1 likes somethingτ2.  
This gives wide scope to ‘someone-he’ (tis-ekeinos), before ‘something’ (ti). The similarity to 
the contemporary formal analogue is obvious:  
(37) y (Fy  x Gyx)  
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 OBJECTION: There are no attested examples of Stoic sentences with pas as the subject expression. 
Therefore these generally do not seem to be cases that the Stoics were interested in or had dealt with. 
REPLY: This objection is unconvincing. We assume that it was the Stoic view that universal 
propositions should be expressed in the form of one of two specific types of indefinite sentences, 
since they took universal sentences to be ambiguous, and that they probably regimented such 
sentences to disambiguate them. Depending on the intended meaning, they were to be formulated as 
indefinite conjunctions or indefinite conditionals (As main evidence we take Cicero Fat. 11-15, also 
DL 7.82 (Sorites), Augustine, Civ. 5.1; for further evidence see Bobzien 1998, 156-167, and the 
discussion in Frede 1974, 101-106).  So it is not the case that the Stoics were not interested in 
sentences with pas. Rather, they found such sentences lacking, since ambiguous, and introduced a 
disambiguating regimentation, presumably for purposes of scientific theory and dialectic. It would 
hence be surprising, if we found such sentences as examples in Stoic logic, and their absence cannot 
be taken as evidence that the Stoics were not interested in the content of what they thought was 
intended to be expressed in natural Greek language in sentences with pas. 
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 εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἐκεῖνος τι φιλεῖ. Cf. SE M 11.8-9.   
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Next assume that (the Greek equivalent to) (35) is intended to express a Stoic 
proposition in which the existential part has wide scope. The Scope Principle suggests that in 
this case the formulation of (35) would not even in principle find Stoic approval – or at least 
not for logical purposes. The immense flexibility of word order in Greek seems to stop short 
of allowing alternatives that start the sentence with an existential particle followed by a 
universal particle (ti pas, say).  We are lucky to have some evidence that guides us in 
reconstructing how the Stoics would have regimented such sentences with wide-scope 
existential. It is based on a parallel case in which the Stoics introduce an existential 
proposition as part of their parsing a simple middle or definite proposition: ‘Kallias is 
walking’ is parsed as ‘There exists a certain Kallias who is walking’ and ‘Kallias is not 
walking’ as   
(38)  ‘There exists a certain Kallias who is not walking’.
106
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 See Alex. An.Pr . 402.15-18, reporting a Stoic view: ‘for they say if Kallias does not exist, «Kallias 
is not walking» is no less false than «Kallias is walking», since in both what is signified is that a 
certain Kallias exists and that walking (or not-walking) holds of him.’ (μὴ γὰρ ὄντος Καλλίου οὐδὲν 
ἧττόν φασι τῆς «Καλλίας περιπατεῖ»  ψευδῆ εἶναι τὴν «Καλλίας οὐ περιπατεῖ» · ἐν ἀμφοτέραις γὰρ 
αὐταῖς εἶναι τὸ σημαινόμενον ἔστι τις Καλλίας, τούτῳ δὲ ὑπάρχει ἢ τὸ περιπατεῖν ἢ τὸ μὴ περιπατεῖν). 
Alexander’s phrasing ‘that walking (or not-walking) holds of him’ is Peripatetic. We think that the 
formulation of two Stoic examples with relative clauses later in the passage is the canonically Stoic 
one (Alex. An.Pr. 402.29-33): ‘so thus the one saying “this one isn’t walking” says what is equivalent 
to “there exists this one indicated here, who isn’t walking”… the one saying “the teacher Kallias isn’t 
walking” says what is equivalent to “there exists a certain teacher Kallias who isn’t walking.”’ 
(οὕτως γὰρ τὸν λέγοντα ‘οὗτος οὐ περιπατεῖ’ ἴσον λέγειν τῷ ‘ἔστιν ὁ δεικνύμενος οὗτος, ὃς οὐ 
περιπατεῖ’. … τὸν λέγοντα ‘Καλλίας ὁ γραμματικὸς οὐ περιπατεῖ’ ἴσον λέγειν τῷ ‘ἔστι τις Καλλίας 
γραμματικός, ὃς οὐ περιπατεῖ’.) See also Alex. An. Pr. 404.27-29.  On Alex. An.Pr . pp. 402-4 see also 
Lloyd 1978. 
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(The Stoic point of this rephrasing is to remove the scope ambiguity of negation by making it 
explicit that Stoic affirmative definite and middle propositions, which include «Kallias is not 
walking», have existential import. The Stoic negation «not: Kallias is walking» does not.) 
Here the structure of a simple middle proposition is made apparent by parsing the structure in 
a sentence that consists of a combination of two clauses. We suggest that in our case of mixed 
quantified sentences with wide-scope existential, Stoic logicians may have used a parallel 
Greek formulation with an indefinite particle instead of a noun or demonstrative pronoun as a 
step towards regimenting the mixed sentences: 
(39) There exists something that every man likes (esti ti ho pas anthrôpos philei).  
This sort of formulation ‘there exists something that ...’ comes as close to an existentially 
quantifying expression in natural language as one may wish for. The Scope Principle gives it 
wide scope in (39). It is also very hard, if not impossible, to read such sentences as having 
‘every’ with wide scope. The Stoics recommend (38) as parsing of the simple proposition 
‘Kallias is not walking’ in the context of evading scope ambiguity i.e. of negation.
107
 It is thus  
entirely plausible that they also recommend formulations like (39) as parsing of a simple 
indefinite proposition to evade scope ambiguity (cf. Egli 2000).  
Some of the Stoic discussion of existential import in simple affirmative propositions 
suggests a parsing of (38) as a ‘conjunction’ with an anaphoric expression 
(40) Socrates exists and he (that one) is walking.
108
 
This shows that the Stoics had all the elements available to parse sentences like (39) as 
indefinite conjunctions
109
 that have an existential first conjunct and an indefinite conditional, 
or Chrysippean universal, as second conjunct:  
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 See previous note.  
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 ἔτι ὁ λέγων ‘Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ’ ἴσον λέγει τῷ ‘ἔστι τις Σωκράτης, κἀκεῖνος περιπατεῖ’ (Alex. 
An. Pr. 404. 27-8). 
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(41) There exists something (esti ti) and if someone is a man, he likes it. 
The parallel with (40) shows that the formulation with an initial existential ‘conjunct’ is not 
conjured out of thin air. Parallel to the case of (40), the parsing of (35) with wide-scope 
existential as (41) gives us the structure of the mixed existential-wide-scope proposition with 
restricted universal without making it a conjunction or a conditional. Again, the similarity to 
contemporary analogues with restriction is obvious. Depending on whether existence was 
considered a predicate (with Ex for ‘x exists’)
110
 they correspond to one of these: 
(42) xy (Fy  Gyx) 
(43) x(Ex y (Fy  Gyx)) 
So, the Stoics are able to indicate the fact that the existential part has wide scope in the 
proposition both with the non-‘conditional’ sentence plus Scope Principle (39) and with the 
‘conditional’ expression of the universal (41).   
Based on the semantics for monadic indefinite propositions, we can offer a 
reconstruction of the semantics of Stoic dyadic indefinite mixed propositions.  For the 
semantics of those with wide-scope existential we combine Stoic truth-conditions for the 
existential with those for the universal, in order. The proposition (41) is true, if a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
109
 See Cic. Fat. 15 and discussion in Bobzien 1998, 156-9; Crivelli 1994a, 201-2. 
110
 We do not here discuss the question whether in these cases the Stoics consider ‘exists’ (εἶναι / 
ὄντα) as a predicate. It appears, though, that they do. Chrysippus thinks the claim that ‘of all things 
that exist, some are good, some bad, some in between’ is equivalent to the universal (indefinite 
conditional) proposition, ‘if some things exist, they are either good or bad or indifferent’ (τῶν ὄντων 
τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ κακά, τὰ δὲ τούτων μεταξύ δυνάμει κατὰ τὸν Χρύσιππον τοιοῦτόν ἐστι 
καθολικόν· εἴ τινά ἐστιν ὄντα, ἐκεῖνα ἤτοι ἀγαθά ἐστιν ἢ κακά ἐστιν ἢ ἀδιάφορα (SE M 11.11, 
mentioned in §5). Note also another regular example in Stoic logic: ‘day exists’ (ἡμέρα ἐστίν, DL 
7.68 et passim). 
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corresponding definite proposition is true. The corresponding definite conjunction has two 
occurrences of a definite pronoun that includes indicating a particular thing twice (‘thisδ1’), in 
lieu of ‘something’ and ‘that thing’:  
(44) Both thisδ1 exists and if someone is a man, he likes thisδ1. 
(44)  is a proper Stoic conjunction with a Stoic indefinite conditional as second conjunct. (It 
can be ‘cut’, see §9.) For (44) to be true, both its conjuncts need to be true. The semantics for 
the first conjunct are clear (§5, fn. 75). So are those for the second, which is a monadic 
universal indefinite proposition (above §6). The indefinite conditional is true when a 
corresponding definite conditional is true. So (41) as a whole is true, when the proposition 
obtained by replacing the indefinite conditional in (44) by a definite one that has two 
occurrences of a definite pronoun that includes indicating a particular thing twice (‘thisδ2’) is 
true: 
(45) Both thisδ1 thing exists and if thisδ2 one is a man, thisδ2 one likes thisδ1 thing. 
So the Stoic semantics of the propositions of kind (41) is straightforward. 
For the semantics of propositions with wide scope – Chrysippean – universal (36) (‘If 
someone is a man, he likes something’) truth-conditions may not fall into place as easily.  
Even so, it is clear that they would logically differ from the narrow scope one. The 
proposition expressed by (36) is true if it cannot have false subordinate cases. Subordinate 
cases are of the kind  
(46) If this oneδ1 is a man, this oneδ1 likes something. 
These are proper conditionals and false if it can be that their antecedent is true and their 
consequent false. So every subordinate case like (46) must be true. Proposition (46) is true if 
it cannot be the case that «this oneδ1 is a man» is true and «this oneδ1 likes something» is 
false. So we cannot have that. In other words, we cannot have «this oneδ1 is a man» true and 
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«not: this oneδ1 likes something» true. Hence we cannot have any proposition be true that is 
of the kind 
(47)  Both this oneδ1 is a man and not: this oneδ1 likes something. 
(For the corresponding semantics of propositions with wide scope ‘Philonian’ universal 
simply replace ‘cannot have’ with ‘has no’, ‘can be’ with ‘is’, ‘must be’ with ‘is’, etc., and 
mutatis mutandis below.)  
 
As for the logical relations between the two kinds of dyadic mixed indefinites, we 
expect proposition (36) to be true whenever proposition (41) is true, but not vice versa. This 
is indeed the case. If there can be no counterexample to (36), there can be none to (41). 
Moreover, (36) can be true when (41) is not. In (36) ‘something’ is not anaphoric, whereas in 
(41) ‘it’ is anaphoric on ‘something’ (ti). And in the definite conditional (45) that corresponds 
to (41), ‘this thing’ has twice the same demonstrated object, whereas for (36) there is no such 
double-demonstration requirement.   
The relevant logical relation between the cases  and  (see introduction) can also 
be expressed. Take for  proposition (32) from §6. (32) is true when there can be no 
counterexample (of two humans who don’t love each other, i.e.): 
(48) Both (both this oneδ1 is human and this oneδ2 is human)
111
 and not: (this oneδ1 loves 
this oneδ2). 
Take for  
(49) If someoneτ1 is human, then that one1 loves someoneτ2 and that one2 is human. 
                                                          
111
 This would corroborate, with an additional case, the Stoic regimentation of the plural (οὗτοι 
ἄνθρωποί εἰσιν). Cf. the example in SE M 10.99 and the extended discussion in Crivelli 1994b.’ See 
also PHerc 307 Col. IV for a case of the pointing at two people.  
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Proposition (49) is true when there cannot be a counterexample (of a human who doesn’t love 
a human, i.e.)  
(50) Both this oneδ1 is human and not: (both this oneδ1 loves someoneτ2 and that one2 is 
human).  
Clearly, if there can be no counterexample (48) to (32), then there can be no counterexample 
(50) to (49). 
In sum, the Stoics thus had all the means available to distinguish both syntactically 
and semantically between the two basic kinds of mixed multiple generality, and without 
variables. Within Stoic logic of predicates and indefinite propositions, the paradigm scope 
ambiguity of mixed-quantifier propositions with dyadic predicates (and restriction on 
universal propositions) can be removed. This is achieved (i) by language regimentation with 
the Scope Principle for sentences with every (pas) and someone (tis) and (ii) at the level of 
parsing propositions, by the parsing of universal propositions into the form of indefinite 
conditionals or indefinite negated conjunctions. Thus the Stoics are able to express 
unambiguously (and without variables) multiple generality for a language with restricted 
universality – in the absence of any anaphoric ambiguity.    
 
8. Anaphoric ambiguity in Stoic quantifying expressions  
Fregean variable-binding quantifiers eliminate two kinds of ambiguity: scope 
ambiguity and anaphoric ambiguity.
112
 In a proposition (or more generally complete content) 
quantification with variables unambiguously binds every occurrence of every variable and 
anaphoric ambiguity does not occur. The Stoics, though, have no variables. Does or can Stoic 
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 We here use ‘anaphoric ambiguity’ as short for ‘context sensitivity of anaphoric expressions that 
cross-refer to non-referring expressions within the same sentence, considered in isolation, with the 
context being a linguistic one’. 
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logic account for anaphoric ambiguity? Consider the following generic stripped-down 
(contemporary) form of the Stoic donkey sentence that expresses proposition (26), with two 
universal quantifying expression that include two occurrences of anaphora   
(51) If someone someone F, then that one that one G. 
Such sentences are potentially ambiguous between 
(52) If someone1 someone2 F, then that one1 that one2 G. 
(53) If someone1 someone2 F, then that one2 that one1 G. 
Again, ‘1’ and ‘2’are used to indicate which anaphoric expression refers to which indefinite  
part(icle). With two indefinite ‘someone’ particles followed by two anaphoric ‘that one’ 
particles, it is ambiguous which anaphora is bound to which particle. Similar ambiguities can 
be observed in mixed quantification.   
In their logic, the Stoics have at their disposal four elements that can in principle play 
the roles of operators of the kind Quine introduces: (i) position or order of Stoic quantifying 
expressions, (ii) active-passive formulations, (iii) declension and (iv) gender. It has baffled 
historians of logic that the Stoics consider all four at the level of Stoic propositions, as 
contrasted with linguistic items.
113
 Stoic theory of (variable-free) quantification may help 
explain why. We consider different cases.  
For two existential quantifiers, our existing examples are ‘someone gives birth to 
someone’ and, implied, ‘someone is someone’s mother’. In principle, there can be ambiguity. 
If we add indices to the indefinite expressions, we have  
(54) Someone1 someone2 gives birth to.  
What determines, informally speaking, who gives birth to whom? Word position is extremely 
flexible in Greek. Nonetheless we have seen that the Stoics regiment position. Another 
disambiguating element is declension. In (54) declension is sufficient in the Greek, since the 
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 See e.g. Frede 1994. Some have simply assumed they must be functions of language (ibid. 13-14). 
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nominative and dative pronouns would differ. The Scope Principle may have required that the 
upright case (orthê ptôsis) be placed first, thereby determining what kind of proposition we 
have. This is consistent with all our examples for indefinite propositions. Declension does 
however not work in cases of equality and identity, for example 
(55) Someone1 someone2 is. 
Stoic corresponding middle and definite propositions are «this one δ1 is this one δ2» and «Dio 
is Theon».
114
 In (55) declension is of no use, and position the only option for disambiguation. 
Alternatively one might argue that, due to symmetry combined with indefiniteness, there is no 
ambiguity, since exchanging ‘someone1’ and ‘someone2’ does not affect what is said.  
(However, we here reserve judgement on the question whether «this one δ1 is this one δ2» is 
the same proposition as «this one δ2 is this one δ1» and «Dio is Theon» the same as « Theon is 
Dio ».) 
The proposition (26) (from §§ 6 and 7) is an example with two pairs of universally 
quantifying parts. (52) and (53) show that and how such sentences are potentially ambiguous. 
In sentence (26), gender indicators avert ambiguity.
115
 We use subscript indices, M, F, MF and N 
as indicators of male, female, male or female, and neuter gender to express this for (26): 
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 ἐστιν οὗτος οὗτος, εἶναι τοῦτον τοῦτον and Δίων Θέων ἐστὶν, Δίωνα Θέωνα εἶναι,  
cf. PHerc 307 Cols IV and V. It is also found in Galen, On Fallacies 4.7-9, for which see discussion 
in Edlow 2017, 64-65, Atherton 1993, 383. 
115
 Some Stoics considered the gender of a demonstrative case-content to be semantically relevant and 
thus part of a proposition: «this oneδM is walking» and «this oneδM is not walking» are both false (false 
by paremphasis, Alex. An. Pr. 402.25-26), if the object of the act of indicating (deixis) is female. 
These two propositions are said to be equivalent to «this oneδM, who is being indicated, exists and is 
(not) walking». For discussion, see Durand 2019, §§21-4. Cf. Alex. An. Pr. 402, 21-30, cited in §7 
above. See also Alex. An. Pr. 404.31-34.  
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(56) If someoneMF to somethingN gives birth, then that oneF to that thingN is mother. 
Gender then works similar to selectional restriction. But gender does not always prevent 
ambiguity. Take the following case: 
(57) If someoneMF to someoneMF gives birth, then that oneF to that oneF is mother.
116
 
This is ambiguous in that it could denote either of the following unregimented propositions 
(58) If someoneMF1 to someoneMF2 gives birth, then that oneF1 to that oneF2 is mother. 
(59) If someoneMF1 to someoneMF2 gives birth, then that oneF2 to that oneF1 is mother. 
Here gender and declension do not help; neither does position alone. We know that de facto 
listeners will, by considerations of charity, choose the interpretation that makes the sentence 
true (e.g. Davidson 1974, Stalnaker 1978, Grice 1989). However, from a Stoic perspective, 
such pragmatic considerations would not be part of logic  nor is such information always 
semantically or contextually provided. This leaves active and passive. Chrysippus wrote a 
book on active and passive predicates, and discussed them elsewhere.
117
 Perhaps the 
following passage gives us his view. In any case it gives a Stoic view.  
(P) Of (monadic) predicates, some are active (ortha), some passive (huptia), and 
some neither. Active are those that, being connected with one of the oblique case-
contents (ptôseis), yield a monadic predicate, for example ‘hears’, ‘sees’, ‘is 
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 Here and in the following sentences (58), (59), (60), (61), (58a) and (59a) the feminine gender in 
the ‘consequent’ disambiguates the feminine or masculine gender in the ‘antecedent’ as feminine. Our 
subscript numerals determine the anaphora relation between the pronouns independent of their 
specific gender indicators. 
117
 DL 7.192, Chrysippus, Log. Inv. fr. 3 lines 4-18; Col. I.23, II.17-21, all noted by Barnes 1999, 206 




 Passive are those that, being connected with a passive particle 
[yield a monadic predicate], for example ‘am heard’, ‘am seen’.
119
 (DL 7.64)   
Stoic active predicates have by definition as content element an oblique case-content, i.e. that 
which would be expressed by a declined noun expression. The examples for the passive 
employ two of the three verbs that are given for the active. This, together with the talk of a 
passive particle
120
 suggests that the Stoics may have thought that one can convert one to the 
other. (A later text says this explicitly.
121
) We may think of the passive particle as something 
like a transformation operator that applied to the active provides the passive (at the content 
level).
122
 A combination of Active-to-passive Conversion with the Scope Principle 
positioning allows the removal of the ambiguity in (57):
123
 
(60) If someoneMF1 to someoneMF2 gives birth, then that oneF1 to that oneF2 is mother. 
(61) If someoneMF1 by someoneMF2 is born, then that oneF1 to that oneF2 is mother. 
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 We read this as saying that an active predicate comes to be by the connection with an oblique case-
content, in the sense that the active predicate is the monadic predicate that is the result of this 
combination. So also Barnes 1999; Hülser 1987-8, 809; Hicks 1925; Mensch 2018. 
119
 DL 7.64: καὶ τὰ μέν ἐστι τῶν κατηγορημάτων ὀρθά, ἃ δ’ ὕπτια, ἃ δ’ οὐδέτερα. ὀρθὰ μὲν οὖν ἐστι 
τὰ συντασσόμενα μιᾷ τῶν πλαγίων πτώσεων πρὸς κατηγορήματος γένεσιν, οἷον Ἀκούει, Ὁρᾷ, 
Διαλέγεται· ὕπτια δ’ ἐστὶ τὰ συντασσόμενα τῷ παθητικῷ μορίῳ, οἷον Ἀκούομαι, Ὁρῶμαι. 
120
 Presumably ὑπό, cf. Gaskin 1997, 92.  
121
 Scholium in Dionysius Thrax, 401.1-20. The ‘philosophers’ mentioned must be Stoic philosophers, 
since the terminology is Stoic.  
122
 Cf. Alex. An. Pr. 403.14-24, reporting Stoic views on the transformation (enklisis) of present to 
past tense. So the Stoics were familiar with a notion of transformation of this kind. 
123
 Note the similarity of this approach to Peter Ludlow’s treatment of bishop sentences in Ludlow 
1994, 171-72. 
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A Principle of Anaphoric Congruence that anaphoric reference is in order of occurrence (the 
first indefinite expression has the first anaphoric expression referring to it; the second 
indefinite expression has the second anaphoric expression referring to it) can then supplement 
the Scope Principle as a second principle for position. Thus position together with Active-to-
passive conversion determines the ‘referent’ of the anaphoric expression. (57) is 
disambiguated into (60) and (61) by use of Anaphoric Congruence with Active-to-passive 
Conversion. Strictly speaking, in this example the Principle of Anaphoric Congruence 
suffices without Active-to-passive Conversion, if one allows for variable case order, so that a 
nominative can take second place.
124
  However, position alone does not suffice in examples 
with a neuter nominative and an accusative expression in the consequent clause, since these 
are generally identical in form. In contrast, Active-to-passive Conversion always allows 
reverse order of the antecedent expressions and thus can handle such examples: 
(60a) If somethingN1 somethingN2 attacks, that thingN1 (ekeino) that thingN2 (ekeino) kills. 
(60b) If somethingN1 by somethingN2 is attacked, that thingF2 (ekeino) that thingN1 (ekeino) 
kills. 
Of course we do not know whether the Stoics suggested such disambiguation by use of 
Anaphoric Congruence with Active-to-passive Conversion. However, it does generally work 
for active and passive predicates. Assume that «…hears Dio» is an active monadic predicate 
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  (58a) If someoneMF1 to someoneMF2 F, then that oneF1 to that oneF2 G. 
(59a) If someoneMF1 to someoneMF2 F, then to that oneF1 that oneF2 G.  
This provides an alternative for those who prefer a different reading of text (P), if at a cost. For, the 
Stoics may have wished to keep the placement of cases for detachment in derivations (for examples 
see the derivations discussed in §9). Instantiation becomes semi-automatic with Active-to-passive 
Conversion. Without, detachment either loses this feature or produces non-canonical formulations, 
e.g. ‘to Hebe Hera is mother’ rather than ‘Hera to Hebe is mother’. 
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(the result of connecting «… hears ---» with «Dio» as an oblique case-content (DL 7.64)), 
and that with «Plato» it forms the proposition «Plato hears Dio». Then an active-to-passive 
transformation yields the proposition «Dio is heard by Plato» formed from «Dio» and the 
passive monadic predicate «--- is heard by Plato». With Stoically regimented Greek word 
order, we get from ‘Plato Dio hears’ to ‘Dio by Plato is heard’ and thus if required can obtain 
the desired order of content-cases.
125
 This may help explain why  unlike for Frege! (1897, 
282)  active and passive are part of the content. It is not so much that e.g. ‘Dio loves Plato’ 
and ‘Plato is loved by Dio’ taken on their own give us detectably different content. What is 
asserted with one does not differ from what is asserted with the other. Rather, it is that in 
certain more complex propositions the active and passive are structuring elements that are 
part of what structures the proposition, and thus are a detectable part of the simple 
proposition in so far as it is part of the more complex proposition. With (60a) ‘someoneF1 to 
someoneF2 gives birth’ the same proposition is expressed (and asserted) as with (61a) 
‘someoneF1 by someoneF2 is born’. However, with the sentences (60) and (61), which contain 
(60a) and (61a) respectively, different complex propositions are expressed (and asserted). If 
the Stoics made use of their distinction of active and passive predicates in this way, we can 
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 If the active content is a dyadic predicate (less than a katêgorêma) this works much the same. «… 
hears ---» connected with the oblique ptôsis «Dio» yields the monadic predicate «… hears Dio» which 
with the upright «Plato» yields the proposition «Plato hears Dio». Then an active-to-passive 
transformation yields the proposition «Dio is heard by Plato» formed from «Dio» and the passive 
monadic predicate «--- is heard by Plato», which yields the dyadic predicate (less-than-katêgorêma)  
«--- is heard by…» and the oblique case-content (ptôsis) «Plato».  
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observe a similarity to Dummett’s distinction between assertoric content and ingredient 
sense (as e.g. set out in Dummett, 1991, 47-50).
126
   
   
 Jointly, position, declension, gender and active-passive appear to suffice to resolve all 
anaphoric ambiguities that may occur within the variable-free framework of Stoic parsing of 
universal and existential quantification. For three-or-more-place predicates, the rules or 
operators based on active-passive, position, gender and declension at the level of content 
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 How would this work for polyadic cases with an adicity higher than two? First note that natural 
languages like English generally have a hard time dealing with such cases when use is restricted to 
simple anaphoric expressions. Take the paradigm ‘x is between y and z’ as example: ‘If something is 
located between something and something, it is neither the same as it nor the same as it.’ The Stoic 
use in their logic of ordinals for schematic representation of propositions in arguments and in their 
formulation of inference rules (themata), suggests that they would have resorted to numerals for such 
cases, as indeed English speakers might, too. The Stoics generally count each of the relevant elements 
and count them in order of occurrence (cf. DL 7.80-81 and Bobzien 2019). For the case at issue this 
would yield ‘if something is between something and something, then it is neither the second thing nor 
the third thing’, and three-dimensionally, ‘if something is between something and something and 
something, then it is neither the second thing nor the third thing nor the fourth thing’, etc. Jointly, the 
Scope Principle and the Principle of Anaphoric Congruence are then sufficient for such cases, 
although there may be instances where some language regulation is required that goes against 
idiomatic formulations. Recall, though, that Greek is very flexible with word order.  
127
 With this suggested reconstruction and elaboration on Stoic indefinite propositions, we can also 
answer the question how to determine whether in the case of simple propositions with dyadic 
predicates and mixed arguments (definite, middle, indefinite) the propositions themselves are definite 
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9. Polyadic predicates in Stoic theory of inference 
Jonathan Barnes contends that the Stoic distinction between monadic and polyadic 
predicates ‘remained inert’ and that ‘no Stoic exploited the distinction in his account of 
inference and syllogism’ (Barnes 1999, 206). Stoic syllogistic or sequent logic (or proof 
theory or theory of deduction) does indeed not include the distinction between monadic and 
polyadic predicates. It is a propositional logic which does not analyse the content of atomic 
(i.e. simple affirmative) propositions (Bobzien 2019).  
However Stoic logic (and that includes inferences) was by no means restricted to 
Stoic syllogistic. We have evidence about the rudiments of a logic of imperatival inferences, 
of a modal logic, of tense logic, of a theory of suppositional inferences, of discussions of 
various logical paradoxes, of certain arguments (probably discussed in the context of the 
Liar) that included intensional expressions like ‘says’, and more.
128
 And as should by now be 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
or middle or indefinite (Brunschwig 1994, 67). First a sentence that expresses such a proposition is 
put in canonical form. This requires the expression that signifies the subject argument to take first 
place, which in the case of secondary event predicates (parasumbamata) would be linguistically 
expressed by the dative. The expression with the largest scope, according to the Scope Principle, then 
determines what kind of proposition we have. 
128
 For example: IMPERATIVES: Barnes 1986, 21-26. MODAL LOGIC: Barnes et al. 1999, 116-121 with 
86-88; Gaskin 1995; Mignucci 1978; Frede 1974, 107-117; Kneale & Kneale 1962, 123-128; Mates 
1961 36-41. TENSE LOGIC: Denyer 1999; Gaskin 1995; Crivelli 1994b; Long and Sedley 1987, v.1, 
51; Vuillemin, 1985. SUPPOSITIONAL INFERENCES: Bobzien 1997; NOBODY PARADOX: Mansfield 
1984, Caston 1999, 187-192; PARADOXES OF PRESUPPOSITION: Bobzien 2012; LIAR PARADOX: 
Barnes et al. 1999, 163-170; Cavini 1993. UNMETHODICALLY-CONCLUSIVE ARGUMENTS: Barnes et 
al. 1999, 151-155; NOBODY PARADOX: Mansfield 1984, Caston 1999, 187-192. 
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clear, we have the rudiments of a variable-free predicate logic for monadic and dyadic 
predicates. 
There is also ample evidence that the Stoics acknowledge the validity of arguments 
(and argument forms or modes (tropoi)) that have a Stoic universal indefinite proposition as 
first premise, an instantiation of the ‘antecedent’ as second premise, and that deduces as 
conclusion an instantiation of the ‘consequent’, where the same case-content, demonstrative 
or not, is instantiated in the second premise and the conclusion:  
(62) ‘If someone is walking, he is moving; this man is walking; therefore this man is 
moving’ (Aug. Dial. 3.84-6; cf. Cic. Fat. 11-15).
129
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 QUESTION: Cannot (62) be taken to show that its first premise is in fact a Stoic conditional, that is, 
a non-simple proposition, since it seems that it could feature in a syllogism of the first indemonstrable 
form?  REPLY: No. The Stoic first indemonstrable is described as being composed of a conditional 
and its antecedent as premises and its consequent as conclusion (DL 7.80, SE M 8.224).  (62) is not of 
that form. FOLLOW-UP QUESTION:  Can we not assume that the first premise in (62) is in fact a Stoic 
conditional, that is, a non-simple proposition, since in a first step the Stoics infer from it a definite or 
middle conditional and then generate a syllogism of the first indemonstrable form with that 
conditional? REPLY: There is no evidence that the Stoics had a valid inference form that permits an 
inference from an indefinite conditional to a corresponding definite or middle conditional. On the 
contrary, the evidence suggests that (62) as it stands was considered to illustrate a valid inference 
form. Both the Augustine passage and Cicero Fat 11-15 suggest that the Stoic inference went directly 
from the indefinite conditional and a definite or middle correspondent to its antecedent to the 
matching correspondent to its consequent. In addition we note that Stoic valid inference forms 
(Antipater’s controversial one-premise arguments aside) (i) all contain at least two premises; 
moreover (ii) it seems that the so-called wholly hypothetical syllogisms, which infer a conditional 
from two conditionals, were not accepted as syllogisms by the Stoics, cf. e.g. Bobzien 2000, so there 
is no precedent for the inference of a conditional from one or more conditionals of the same size (i.e. 
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Moreover, there is evidence that the Stoics were specifically concerned with certain questions 
about inferences that involve indefinite propositions. First in line is the so-called Nobody 
paradox (outis), about which Chrysippus wrote eight books (DL 7.198). It is described as ‘an 
argument composed of an indefinite and a definite [proposition] that has its second premise 
and conclusion connected’ (DL 7.82). As most ancient paradoxes it came in several variants. 
One is apparently ‘if someone is here, he is not in Rhodes; but a man is here; hence not: a 
man is in Rhodes’ (DL 7.82).
130
 It is not hard to guess that the non-referring character of 
‘someone’ and ‘nobody’, and the resulting restrictions on inference, played a central role in 
the discussion of this paradox. Second, in the same section of Chrysippean book titles on 
inferences, two books ‘on arguments from indefinite and definite [propositions]’ are 
sandwiched between titles of books on the Nobody (DL 7.198). This suggests their form is 
related to the form of the Nobody arguments. We assume that either (62) is an example of 
such ‘arguments [composed] from an indefinite and a definite [proposition] (i.e. as 
premises)’, or that they are of the more basic kind  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
with the same number of two-place connectives). We believe then that we are on safe ground in 
assuming that (62) does not in any way show that for the Stoics indefinite conditionals (and indefinite 
negated conjunctions) were considered non-simple propositions. 
130
 Reading συντακτικὸς with Long: οὔτις δέ ἐστι λόγος συντακτικὸς ἐξ ἀορίστου καὶ ὡρισμένου, 
συνεστώς πρόσληψιν δὲ καὶ ἐπιφορὰν ἔχων, οἷον “εἴ τίς ἐστιν ἐνταῦθα, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκεῖνος ἐν Ῥόδῳ. 
<ἀλλὰ μήν ἐστί ἄνθρωπος ἐνταῦθα· οὐκ ἄρα ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἐν Ῥόδῳ>” (DL 7.82). We choose this 
reading based on the parallel with DL 7.198 (see main text), and choose ‘a man’ (ἄνθρωπος) rather 
than Dorandi’s someone (τίς) in the supplemented second premise and conclusion, since all other 
extant versions of the Nobody have ἄνθρωπος. For the variants of the Nobody see e.g. DL 7.82 and 
7.187; further evidence in Hülser 1987-8 as texts 1205-1207, 1209, 1247-1251; cf. also Mansfeld 
1984, Caston 1999, 187-192.  
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(62a) ‘If someone is walking, he is moving; this one is walking; therefore this one is 
moving’.  
(It is not unusual for Stoic illustrative arguments to be transmitted in slight variations.) Third, 
Chrysippus also wrote books entitled ‘Proofs that one must not cut the indefinites’ and ‘Reply 
to those that disagree with those who are against the cut of the indefinites’ (DL 7.197). Here 
‘indefinites’ is likely to refer to indefinite conditionals and indefinite (negations of) 
conjunctions and ‘to cut’ is likely to be a technical term. There are two plausible and related 
meanings: (i) One cannot cut an indefinite conditional into two component propositions. (ii) 
One cannot detach a conclusion. That is, from ‘if someone F that one G’ one cannot detach, 
by using as second premise ‘someone F’, ‘that one G’ as conclusion. Since the titles are in 
the section of titles on inferences, the latter is more likely. There is no reason to assume that 
whatever is discussed in all these Chrysippean books is limited to indefinite propositions with 
monadic predicates.  
Let us add to this indirect support for Stoic discussion of arguments with non-idle 
polyadic predicates, that it is implied by (26) that the Stoics have inference schemata or 
argument forms that contain non-idle multiply generalized sentences. Here are text (I) (which 
contains (26)) and text (O) in succession:  
 (I) A proposition is plausible if it provokes assent, for example «If someone gave 
birth to something, then she is its mother». (O) But this is false. For the hen is not the 
mother of an egg. (DL 7.75) 
This points toward the Stoics accepting as true and valid arguments such as: 
(63) If someone to something gave birth, that one of that thing is the mother. 
 Now Hera to Hebe gave birth. 
 Hence Hera of Hebe is the mother.
131
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 The questions in fn. 129 could be rehashed here. The answers can as well. 
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and as valid arguments such as: 
(64) If someone to something gave birth, that one of that thing is the mother. 
 Now this hen to this egg gave birth. 
 Hence this hen of this egg is the mother. 
More generally, it points toward their accepting the validity of argument forms like: 
(65) If something1 something2 F, that thing1 that thing2 G. 
 Now abF. 
 Hence abG.   
Why is this implied? It is implied, since the hen-egg case is adduced as a counterexample to 
the truth of the indefinite conditional (26). But the hen-egg case produces such a 
counterexample only because there is an assumed valid argument form of the kind (64) that 
admits instantiation, with middle or definite propositions for ‘antecedent’ and ‘consequent’. 
We conclude that it is exceedingly likely that multiple generality was not inferentially idle in 
Stoic logic.  
  
10. Conclusion 
We have seen that the Stoics used regimented variable-free formulations for 
expressing existential and universal quantifying propositions with monadic and dyadic 
predicates. The structure of existential propositions with simple monadic predicates is 
determined by the positioning of the Stoic quantifying expression, which can be understood 
retrospectively as combining the existence prefix with the variable it binds. All universal 
propositions are parsed by the Stoics as having indefinite conditional form in which the 
indefinite part in the ‘consequent’ anaphorically cross-refers to the non-referring indefinite 
part in the ‘antecedent’. That is, they have the form of if-clause donkey sentences. (For 
‘unrestricted’ universals, the ‘antecedent’ could have used an existence predicate.) The 
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combination of rigid position with the parsing of universals as indefinite conditionals is 
adequate for the monadic cases.  
The combination of rigid position and conditional formulation of universals without 
binding variables also suffices for cases of dyadic predicates, as long as there is no ambiguity 
introduced by the anaphoric expressions. Whether the Stoics introduced conditional 
formulations in order to avoid the problems of multiple generality, or whether they were 
simply chosen to accurately represent the structure of propositions with monadic and dyadic 
predicates (including the different structures of their two kinds of universals), and the 
problems of multiple generality consequently just did not arise, we do not know.  For cases of 
anaphoric ambiguity in propositions with polyadic predicates, rigid position and conditional 
formulation of universals are supplemented with case marking, gender marking and active-
passive transformation, all of which the Stoics place at the level of content, and thus logic, as 
opposed to linguistic expressions and grammar.   
At least for dyadic generality, the combination of case marking, gender marking and 
active-passive transformation with rigid position and conditional formulation of universals, 
makes it possible to develop a system that covers the ground Fregean variable-binding 
quantifiers so niftily control. The Stoic placement of cases, gender and active-passive at the 
level of content is thus justified. The five factors converge into a method that ensures a 
system of equal strength as variable-binding quantifiers for dyadic predicates that can be 
expressed in (ancient Greek) natural language without undue deformations. The fact that 
Greek is case-based and has very flexible word order makes the addition of rules for rigid 
positioning easy. Some evidence implies that the Stoics considered argument forms that 
contain propositions with multiple generality, and that polyadic predicates were not 
inferentially idle in Stoic logic. 
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 We have not offered a worked-out formal Stoic predicate logic. This would require an 
integration of Stoic indefinite propositions with their propositional logic. Neither have we 
ventured beyond dyadic predicates, although it seems to us that up to a point generalization to 
polyadic predicates is possible. Nor have we discussed the relation between Stoic logic and 
medieval and early Renaissance treatments of multiple generality.
132
 Patently, there is space 
                                                          
132
 We are no experts in medieval or early Renaissance philosophy. It seems to us, though, that the 
attempts at solving the problems of multiple generality by medieval philosophers are generally 
impeded by their commitment to Aristotelian term logic and to their notion of suppositio, so that 
solutions, even if possible, would be described by them in unnecessarily convoluted ways. We do not 
doubt that the syntax and semantics of medieval Latin could handle multiple generality, nor that 
Terence Parsons’ ingenious Linguish (Parsons 2014) may reflect this fact; nor that some cases of 
multiple generality could be handled by suppositio (see e.g. Ashworth 1978). Nor do we deny that 
Parsons’ Linguish, like Stoic quantification as we interpret it, relies on anaphora and variable-free 
quantifying. However, to us, the pertinent question seems to be how the ancient and medieval 
philosophers themselves theorized about multiple generality, and here the differences appear 
considerable. The Stoics’ notion of a function-like predicate and their regimented representation of 
universals as indefinite conditionals sets them on a path of likely success, as does their concept of a 
regimented language itself, and their theory seems astoundingly modern and uncomplicated. By 
contrast, the advanced mental yoga required to express in terms of suppositio the reconstruction 
Parsons offers requires a linguistic suppleness that only few can master and with markedly twisted 
results. Moreover, the positive results appear restricted to combinations with a genitive phrase, as e.g. 
with ‘some person’s donkey’, ‘every person’s donkey’. That said, we do not deny that the medieval 
and early Renaissance logicians may have had a better theoretical grasp on the problems of multiple 
generality than the Stoics or that there is more evidence that they discussed the question of the validity 
of inferences with multiply general premises. Still, a main reason why they encounter these problems 
in the first place is their Aristotelian term-logical conceptualization of the structure of sentences, 
something the Stoics did not have to face.  
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for further research. Our goal was to make a case for the claim that a logical treatment of 
multiple generality is found long before Frege, already in antiquity.  
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